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Technology advancement has made multimedia content widely available and
easy to process. These benefits also bring ease to unauthorized users who can du-
plicate and manipulate multimedia content, and redistribute it to a large audience.
Unauthorized distribution of information has posed serious threats to government
and commercial operations. Digital fingerprinting is an emerging technology to
protect multimedia content from such illicit redistribution by uniquely marking
every copy of the content distributed to each user. One of the most powerful
attacks from adversaries is collusion attack where several different fingerprinted
copies of the same content are combined together to attenuate or even remove the
fingerprints. An ideal fingerprinting system should be able to resist such collusion
attacks and also have low embedding and detection computational complexity, and
require low transmission bandwidth.
To achieve aforementioned requirements, this thesis presents a joint coding
and embedding framework by employing a code layer for efficient fingerprint con-
struction and leveraging the embedding layer to achieve high collusion resistance.
Based on this framework, we propose two new joint-coding-embedding techniques,
namely, permuted subsegment embedding and group-based joint-coding-embedding
fingerprinting. We show that the proposed fingerprinting framework provides an
excellent balance between collusion resistance, efficient construction, and efficient
detection. The proposed joint coding and embedding techniques allow us to model
both coded and non-coded fingerprinting under the same theoretical model, which
can be used to provide guidelines of choosing parameters.
Based on the proposed joint coding and embedding techniques, we then con-
sider real-world applications, such as DVD movie mass distribution and cable TV,
and develop practical algorithms to fingerprint video in such challenging practical
settings as to accommodate more than ten million users and resist hundreds of
users’ collusion. Our studies show a high potential of joint coding and embedding
to meet the needs of real-world large-scale fingerprinting applications. The popu-
larity of the subscription based content services, such as cable TV, inspires us to
study the content protection in such scenario where users have access to multiple
contents and thus the colluders may pirate multiple movie signals. To address
this issue, we exploit the temporal dimension and propose a dynamic fingerprint-
ing scheme that adjusts the fingerprint design based on the detection results of
previously pirated signals. We demonstrate the advantages of the proposed dy-
namic fingerprinting over conventional static fingerprinting. Other issues related
to multimedia fingerprinting, such as fingerprinting via QIM embedding, are also
discussed in this thesis.
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Technology advancement has made multimedia content widely available and easy
to process. These benefits also bring ease to unauthorized users who can duplicate
and manipulate multimedia content, and redistribute it to a large audience. In-
formation leak has posed serious threats to commercial markets and government
security. According to a survey in 2006 by L.E.K. Consulting LLC under the com-
mission of Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), U.S. movie studios
are losing about $6.1 billion annually in global wholesale revenue to piracy [1].
Another example is that a classified video on Bin Ladens camp shared between
the Pentagon and CIA officials was leaked to the news media [2]. Without effective
traitor tracing tools, there would remain the reluctance for different agencies to
share critical information and thus jeopardize the mission in fighting terrorism and
defending the national and global security. Therefore, the protection of multimedia
content becomes increasingly important.
Digital fingerprinting is an emerging technology to protect multimedia content
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from such unauthorized dissemination, whereby a unique ID representing each user,
called digital fingerprint, is embedded in his/her copy. When a copy is leaked, the
embedded fingerprint can help trace back to the source of the leak. Adversaries
may apply various attacks to remove the fingerprints before redistribution. One of
the most powerful attacks from attackers is collusion attack, where several different
fingerprinted copies of the same content are combined together to attenuate or even
remove the fingerprints. In addition to resistance against attacks, three aspects
of system efficiency need to be considered when designing an anti-collusion finger-
printing system, namely, the efficiency in constructing, detecting, and distributing
fingerprinted signals. Construction efficiency concerns the computational com-
plexity involved during the generation of fingerprinted content; if the complexity
is high, we say the construction efficiency is low and vice versa. Similarly, detection
efficiency is related to the detection computational complexity. The distribution
efficiency refers to the amount of bandwidth consumed during the transmission of
all the fingerprinted signals through cable or wireless network. The more band-
width the transmission requires, the lower the efficiency of distribution is. An
ideal fingerprinting system should have high collusion resistance, low embedding
and detection computational complexity and low transmission bandwidth.
1.2 Related Prior Work
A growing number of techniques have been proposed recently concerning collusion-
resistant fingerprinting for multimedia data. Many of them fall in one of the two
categories according to whether an explicit discrete coding step is involved. In the
non-coded category, a typical example is orthogonal fingerprinting, which assigns
each user a spread spectrum sequence as fingerprint and the sequence is typically
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orthogonal to those for other users [21, 71]. The collusion resistance performance
of orthogonal fingerprinting can be improved by introducing correlation to the
fingerprints for users who are likely to collude together due to cultural and other
relations [70]. The non-coded fingerprinting is a natural extension from spread
spectrum embedding [17] and is easy to implement. A weakness of non-coded
fingerprinting schemes is that the number of long basis sequences needed and the
computational complexity of detection would increase linearly with the number of
users.
Building coded fingerprints for generic data (such as executable software pro-
grams and bitstreams) was investigated by the coding and cryptography commu-
nities. Early work can be traced back to the 1980s [7, 69]. A concept of marking
assumption was introduced by Boneh and Shaw in [8, 9], and a two-level binary
code construction known as a c-secure code was proposed to resist up to c colluders
with high probability. This binary code was later used to modulate a direct spread
spectrum sequence to embed fingerprints codes in multimedia signals [78]. By
explicitly exploiting the multimedia characteristics through selecting appropriate
modulation and embedding schemes, a more compact code was introduced in [64]
based on combinatorial design to identify colluders through the code bits shared
by them.
Many recent works on coded fingerprinting [4, 5, 62] extend Boneh and Shaw’s
marking assumption on the collusion and consider the construction of codes with
traceability, such as the identifiable parent property (IPP) code and the traceabil-
ity (TA) code. Among these codes, TA codes are stronger than other codes in
terms of tracing capability and can be systematically constructed using well estab-
lished error correcting code (ECC). Thus TA codes are widely used in the coded
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fingerprinting literature. For example, the works in [52] and [54] applied the ECC
based TA code to multimedia fingerprinting and extended it to deal with symbol
erasures contributed by noise or cropping in the multimedia signal domain. An-
other reason that researchers favor ECC for fingerprint code construction is that
some ECCs, such as the algebraic-geometry codes, have efficient decoding algo-
rithms. For example, the Guruswami-Sudan soft-decision list decoding algorithm
is employed in [22] for the algebraic-geometry code to identify multiple colluders.
In this thesis, we shall refer to the coded fingerprinting constructed on ECC as the
ECC-based Fingerprinting.
In the existing coded fingerprinting works that originated from fingerprinting
generic data, the special properties and issues of multimedia signal have not been
sufficiently explored in the code design. Although some papers [22,52] claimed that
their schemes are for multimedia, the embedding issues are handled in a rather
abstract level through models based on the marking assumptions [9, 52]. The
prior works typically assume that colluders can only change fingerprint symbols in
which they have different values, and the colluders assemble pieces of their codes
to generate a colluded version. The marking assumption based on generic data are
not sufficient to model multimedia fingerprinting where colluders can manipulate
fingerprinted multimedia in the signal domain, bringing the equivalent changes
in the code domain beyond the conventional marking assumption. In the mean
time, as has been shown in [64], by jointly exploring embedding and coding, we
can substantially limit the effective ways that attackers may exploit. Thus it is
important to examine the overall performance across coding and signal domains,
taking into account the coding, embedding, attack, and detection issues.
This thesis addresses the issues on the theory and design of collusion-resistant
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multimedia fingerprinting. We jointly consider coding and embedding and propose
two new techniques, which substantially improve the collusion resistance of ECC
based fingerprinting, while still preserving its advantages of compact representa-
tion and efficient detection. We further extend the joint coding and embedding
framework to address the practical applications with challenging requirements of
holding millions of users and resisting hundreds of colluders and design fingerprint-
ing schemes for protecting contents in subscription based content services.
1.3 Thesis Organization and Contributions
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 starts with background overview
on multimedia fingerprinting and then presents a general framework of coded fin-
gerprinting for multimedia signals. Code construction and fingerprint embedding
for anti-collusion purposes are discussed. We also examine the performance of con-
ventional ECC-based fingerprinting and compare it with orthogonal fingerprinting,
in terms of collusion resistance and detection efficiency.
Based on the framework and the performance examination in Chapter 2, Chap-
ter 3 presents our first proposed joint coding and embedding technique, namely,
permuted subsegment embedding technique. We demonstrate the advantages of
the proposed technique in terms of collusion resistance, detection complexity and
efficient distribution. By employing the proposed technique, we then analyze the
collusion resistance of the fingerprinting constructed on different codes, and study
the effects of code parameters on the system performance.
Chapter 4 presents the second proposed joint-coding-embedding technique,
called group-based joint coding and embedding (GRACE) technique. By taking
advantage of the prior knowledge on the collusion pattern, we construct compact
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fingerprints that consist of user sub-codeword and group sub-codeword and are
embedded in host signal via spread spectrum technique. The detection is done
in two levels, which identifies guilty groups through correlation and then narrows
down to specific colluders through minimum distance decoding. To further im-
prove the detection performance, we propose an adaptive group detection method
which can adaptively adjust the group detection parameter according to the ob-
served collusion pattern. We examine the performance of the proposed method
and compare it with the existing non-grouped fingerprinting.
Chapter 5 considers how to employ the proposed joint coding and embedding
framework and develop practical algorithms to fingerprint video in such challeng-
ing practical settings as to accommodate more than ten million users and resisting
hundreds of users’ collusion. We investigate the proper code structure for large-
scale fingerprinting and propose a trimming detection technique that can signifi-
cantly reduce the detection computational complexity with little reduction in the
detection probability. We conduct experiments on video signals to show the po-
tential of joint coding and embedding to meet the needs of real-world large-scale
fingerprinting applications.
Chapter 6 explores two research directions related to multimedia fingerprint-
ing. The first one addresses protecting multimedia content from unauthorized
redistribution in subscription based services, where adversaries work together to
pirate multiple multimedia programs during a subscription period. We exploit the
temporal dimension and propose a dynamic fingerprinting scheme that adjusts the
fingerprint design based on the detection results of previously pirated signals. We
also examine colluders strategies to combat the tracing by dynamic fingerprinting.
The second study explores the Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) embedding
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methods for fingerprinting applications. We first employ Dither Modulation (DM)
technique and extend it for embedding multiple symbols through a basic dither
sequence design. We then develop a theoretical model and propose a new algo-
rithm to improve the collusion resistance of the basic scheme. We further explore
coded fingerprinting based on spread transform dither modulation (STDM) em-
bedding and compare its performance with spread spectrum based fingerprinting
under both blind and non-blind detections.







In this chapter, we first provide the background for multimedia fingerprinting and
briefly discuss fingerprint design schemes. We then introduce a general framework
of coded fingerprinting for multimedia signals by integrating coding and embedding
issues. Focusing on ECC code construction, we examine the overall performance of
conventional ECC-based fingerprinting across both coding and embedding layers,
and compare it with orthogonal fingerprinting in various aspects, such as collusion
resistance and detection efficiency.
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2.1 General Framework of Multimedia Finger-
printing
A multimedia fingerprinting system generally consists of three parts: fingerprint
embedding, fingerprint attacks and fingerprint detection. In fingerprint embedding
process, content owner generates fingerprint for each user and embed it through
robust digital watermarking technique into the original signal to generate each
user’s copy. The fingerprint should be embedded imperceptibly and robustly [16].
Imperceptibility can be achieved by employing human perceptual model to control
the distortion introduced by the embedded fingerprint so that the fingerprinted
signal is perceptually similar to the original version. Robustness requires the em-
bedded fingerprints survive intentional or unintentional processing introduced by
users or attackers, such as compression and filtering.
After the fingerprinted signals are distributed to end users, adversaries may
apply various attacks to try to remove their fingerprints. One powerful and cost-
effective attack is called collusion attack, whereby several different fingerprinted
copies of the same content are combined together to attenuate or even remove
the fingerprints. There are many ways to launch collusion attacks. A simple yet
effective way is to average the corresponding signal components or features from
multiple copies, called averaging collusion. Attackers can also apply order statistics
based collusions such as taking the minimum value of their corresponding signal
components. The colluded signal may be distributed outside the authorized group.
Once the content owner obtains the suspicious content, he/she can apply finger-
print detection to extract the fingerprint and then identify the possible colluders.
Depending on the availability of the host signal to the detector, fingerprint detec-
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tion can be performed blindly or non-blindly [16]. In non-blind detection, the host
signal is available to the detector and it is usually subtracted from the received
signal to remove its interference before detection. In blind detection, the detector
does not have access to the host signal and thus its effect cannot be completely re-
moved from the received signal, which may serve as a strong noise to the detector.
In most fingerprinting applications, host signal is often available to the detector,
and thus in this thesis we mainly focus on non-blind detection. Discussions on
fingerprint design under blind detection will be presented in Chapter 6.
2.2 Background on Robust Data Embedding
In this section, we provide an overview of the spread spectrum embedding that
has been widely used in the multimedia fingerprinting literature. We then discuss
several fingerprint design schemes.
Spread Spectrum Embedding
Due to its excellent robustness and invisibility under non-blind detection [16,29,43],
spread spectrum embedding has been widely used in multimedia fingerprinting [34,
37,71]. As illustrated in Fig. 2.1, watermark is modulated by a random noise-like
signal following zero-mean Gaussian distribution, which is then scaled according
to human visual model to control the introduced distortion to be lower than the
noticeable threshold. The modulated signal is then added to the components of
the original signal in the embedding domain to produce the watermarked signal.
The embedding process can be formulated as











Original Signal Watermarked Signal 
Figure 2.1: Spread Spectrum Watermark Embedding.
where x is the original signal; y is the watermarked signal; s is the watermark; α
is the scaling factor used to adjust the watermark energy; and JND denotes Just
Noticeable Difference and it is employed to control the visual distortion.
During the detection, the host signal x is first subtracted from the received
signal to obtain test signal z. The received signal may have undergone further
processings and we model them as additive noise d. The detection of the spread
spectrum watermarking can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
H0 : z = (x + d)− x = d watermark is absent,
H1 : z = (y + d)− x = s + d watermark is present.
(2.1)
Under the assumption of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), i.e. d follows
i.i.d. Gaussian distribution N(0, σ2d), the optimal detector takes the form of a
correlator. The detection statistic T follows a Gaussian distribution
T = zT s/‖s‖ =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
N(0, σ2d) watermark is absent,
N(‖s‖, σ2d) watermark is present.
T is then compared with threshold h: if T > h, there is watermark; otherwise, no
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watermark is detected. The threshold h controls the tradeoff between probability
of detection and false alarm.
Fingerprint Design
In general, multimedia fingerprinting can be classified into two categories: non-
coded fingerprinting, which does not involve explicit code design during fingerprint
construction, and coded fingerprinting, which builds fingerprints based on code
structure.
Orthogonal fingerprinting is a typical example of non-coded fingerprinting and
is a natural extension from spread spectrum watermarking [71]. In this fingerprint-
ing scheme, each user is assigned a spread spectrum sequence as fingerprint, and
sequences for different users are mutually orthogonal. The advantages of orthogo-
nal fingerprinting are that it can well distinguish users and is easy to implement.
However, as will be shown in Section 2.4, the required spreading sequences and
the detection computational complexity increase linearly with the number of users,
which become prohibitively high when the system scales up to hold a large number
of users.
Coded fingerprinting introduces correlation among users’ fingerprints accord-
ing to the code structure and thus allows fewer spreading sequences to represent
more users. Two types of modulation schemes are usually employed in coded fin-
gerprinting: CDMA modulation and TDMA modulation [74]. In CDMA type of






where bij is the i-th code bit for user j, which usually takes value from {−1, +1},
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B is the code length, and ui is the spreading sequence for the i-th bit. Through
this type of construction, the required base spreading sequences can be reduced to
be much fewer than the number of users. However, the computational complexity
of fingerprint construction and detection is still on the same order as that of or-
thogonal fingerprinting and the code is mainly restricted to binary code. On the
other hand, as will be shown in this thesis, TDMA type of modulation along with
M-ary code provide a lot of freedom to construct fingerprints with fewer spread-
ing sequences and lower computational complexity in detection. We will explore
the potential of employing TDMA modulation and ECC code for fingerprint con-
struction. We start with a detailed discussion on ECC-based fingerprinting and
performance examination in the following sections.
2.3 ECC-based Fingerprinting
Fingerprint construction and embedding are two important issues for a multimedia
fingerprinting system. We illustrate a framework of applying coded fingerprinting
for multimedia data in Fig. 2.2, which consists of a coding layer and an embed-
ding layer. As discussed in Section 2.2, the spread spectrum additive embedding
technique or its variations is a viable choice for the embedding layer, owing to its
excellent robustness under non-blind detection that has been demonstrated in the
literature [16–18, 29, 43]. A symbol in a fingerprint code over an alphabet of size
q can be mapped to a signal suitable for embedding through various modulation
techniques [73,74]. Orthogonal modulation that uses q mutually orthogonal signals
to represent q symbol values widely separates the different symbols in the signal
domain, and thus gives higher detection accuracy.
























Figure 2.2: A framework of the embedded ECC based fingerprinting.
the marking assumptions [8, 9, 52,56]. We now replace the abstraction of marking
assumptions with a modulation and embedding layer for a complete system of
multimedia fingerprinting. Thus the layered structure of ECC based fingerprinting
system includes an ECC code layer and a spread spectrum based embedding layer,
along with an attack channel where we mainly focus on collusion attacks. In the
following, we shall address several important issues of ECC based fingerprinting
over the three main stages, namely, fingerprinting, collusion attacks, and detection.
2.3.1 Fingerprinting
During the fingerprinting process, we first choose an ECC code over an alphabet
with size q, and assign a codeword to each user. The design requirement of this
ECC fingerprint code will be discussed later in this section.
We partition the host signal into non-overlapped segments, where each segment
is to carry one symbol of the fingerprint code. The partition can be done spatially
into blocks for image, or temporally into frames for video and audio. Within each
segment, we use q mutually orthogonal spread spectrum sequences {ui, i = 1, ..., q}
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with identical energy ||u||2 to represent the q possible symbol values, and add one
of these sequences into the segment (with perceptual scaling [49]) according to the
symbol value in the fingerprint code. Each fingerprinted segment can be modelled
as
yjk = usym(j,k) + xk, (2.2)
where xk is the k
th segment of a host signal, and yjk is the k
th fingerprinted
segment for the jth user. The function sym(j, k) is used to retrieve the symbol for
the kth segment from the jth user’s codeword, and usym(j,k) is the spread spectrum
sequence corresponding to the symbol value. The concatenation of all fingerprinted
segments forms the ultimate fingerprinted signal.
2.3.2 Collusion Attacks
In most existing works concerning fingerprinting, it is assumed that the colluders
can only change the fingerprint code symbols where they see different values within
the colluder group [9], and a colluded version is constructed by assembling pieces
of the colluders’ codewords [52]. We refer to this as (symbol-based) interleaving
collusion. Additional distortion may be added to the multimedia signal during the
collusion, which we model as additive noise. Since few colluders would be willing
to take higher risk than others, they generally would make contributions of an
approximately equal amount in the collusion [76].
In addition to interleaving collusion, colluders can manipulate fingerprinted
multimedia in the signal domain, incurring a variety of code-domain changes be-
yond the marking assumptions. A simple yet effective way is to average the corre-
sponding signal components or features from multiple copies [64], bringing changes








sj + x + d, (2.3)
where z is the colluded signal, x is the host signal, d is the noise term, sj represents
the fingerprint sequence for user j, Sc is the colluder set, and c is the number of
colluders. Studies in [82] have shown that a number of non-linear collusions can
be well approximated by an averaging collusion plus additive noise. Thus we
will mainly focus on the interleaving and averaging collusions in this thesis. For
simplicity in analysis, we assume that the additional noise under both collusions
follows i.i.d. Gaussian distribution. The effects of many other distortions have
been studied in the watermarking literature, such as quantization/compression
and geometric distortions. And since the original host signal is often available to
detector in fingerprinting applications, we can use it as a reference and the effects
of many distortions can be approximated well by additive noise.
2.3.3 Detection
At the detector side, our goal is to catch one of the colluders with high probability.
We first determine which symbol is present in each multimedia segment through
a correlation detector commonly used for spread spectrum embedding [17,71]. As
host signal can be made available to detectors in many fingerprinting applications,
we register the suspicious copy with host signal and subtract host signal from the
suspicious copy to obtain a test signal. Then for each segment of the test signal,
we employ a maximum correlation detector to identify the symbol; that is, we
correlate it with each of the q spreading sequences, identify the sequence giving
the maximum correlation, and record the corresponding symbol. The detection
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statistic for the kth segment is defined as
Ts(k, i) =
(zk − xk)Tui√‖ui‖2 , i = 1, 2, ..., q, (2.4)
where zk and xk represent the k
th segment of the colluded signal and original signal,
respectively. The extracted symbol from kth segment is î = arg maxi=1,2,...,q Ts(k, i).
With the sequence of symbols extracted from all segments using this maximum
detector, we proceed to the ECC code layer and apply a decoding algorithm to
identify the colluder whose codeword has the most matched symbols with the
extracted symbol sequence.
Alternatively, we can employ a soft-detection strategy to keep the correlation
results of Eqn.(2.4) with each of the q possible sequences at every segment with-
out determining the symbol value, and then collect the results from all segments




Ts(k, sym(j, k)) j = 1, 2, ..., Nu, (2.5)
where L is the code length, and Nu is the total number of users. Note that this
approach has the correlation results equivalent to1 a matched-filter detector [51]
that correlates the entire test signal with each user’s fingerprint sequence sj by
TN(j) =
(z− x)T sj√‖s‖2 j = 1, 2, ..., Nu. (2.6)
Here, ‖s‖ = ‖sj‖ for all j based on the equal energy construction. The user whose
fingerprint has the highest correlation value TN(j) is identified as the colluder,
1As we shall see later in Section 2.4.1, computing the partial correlation and then aggregating
together is a more efficient implementation than taking the Nu correlation results on the whole
signal. In this thesis, we shall employ this efficient implementation for the matched-filter detector
in Eqn.(2.6) for ECC based fingerprinting.
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i.e. ĵ = arg maxj=1,2,...,Nu TN(j). Compared with the former 2-step hard-decision
scheme, the latter scheme takes advantage of the soft information on the symbol
level and provides a better collusion identification performance. In both hard and
soft detectors, we always make decisions on the colluder identification and only
accuse one user as the colluder. Therefore, the probability of false positive will be
one minus the probability of detection.
Under the above framework, the non-coded orthogonal fingerprinting can be
seen as a special case that the alphabet size q equals the total number of users
Nu and the codeword length equals 1. The detection for orthogonal fingerprinting
is done by first correlating the test signal with each user’s sequence and then
identifying the user with the highest correlation statistic as the colluder.
2.3.4 Considerations on ECC Fingerprint Codes
A common practice in fingerprint code design treats the symbols contributed from
other colluders as errors, and makes the minimum distance between codewords
large enough to tolerate the errors. The minimum distance requirement ensures
that the best match with a colluded codeword (referred to as the descendant)
comes from one of the true colluders. The c-TA code [13,14] is such an example.
Let Γ ⊆ QL be a code over an alphabet Q with length L and Nu codewords.
Without loss of generality, we consider the first c users as colluders. The set of c
colluders is denoted as C = {v1, ...,vc} ⊂ Γ, where a codeword vi ∈ Γ represents







A codeword set that can descend from this colluder set is denoted as
desc(C) = {[x1...xL] : xj ∈ {w(i)j : 1 ≤ i ≤ c}, 1 ≤ j ≤ L}.
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If for any descendant [x1...xL] ∈ desc(C), there is a vi ∈ C such that
|{j : xj = w(i)j }| > |{j : xj = sj}|
for any innocent user’s codeword [s1...sL] ∈ ΓC, where the notation |·| is the car-
dinality, then Γ is called a c-traceability (c-TA) code and denoted as c−TAq(L,Nu)
with q = |Q| .
Under the conventional marking assumptions, a c-TA code can be constructed
using an ECC if its minimum distance D satisfies [56]
D > (1− 1
c2
)L, (2.7)
where L is the code length and c is the colluder number.
As mentioned earlier, most of the existing works [22, 52] mainly consider the
outer layer of the system (i.e. the ECC code layer), and deal with the embedding
through marking assumptions. However, the distortions and attacks mounted by
adversaries on the fingerprinted multimedia can lead to errors in detecting finger-
print code symbols, which is beyond the marking assumptions. The existing work
on c-TA codes has been extended to tolerate erasures only [52]. We note that there
is nontrivial probability for false alarms in symbol detection, which contributes to
the non-erased erroneous colors that are not contributed by any colluders. Thus
we need to consider both erasure and non-erasure errors when designing finger-
print code. In the following, we extend the definition of c-TA code to account for
both types of errors and develop a minimum distance requirement with a similar
strategy used in [52].
As before, we consider a code Γ of length L over an alphabet Σ of size q.
This code is called a c-traceability code tolerating Le erasures and LFA errors and
denoted as c-TAq(L,Nu; LFA, Le) if for any (x1, ..., xL) ∈ X(C), there is a colluder’s
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codeword ui ∈ C such that |{j : xj = w(i)j }| > |{j : xi = sj}| for any innocent
user’s codeword (s1, ..., sL) ∈ Γ \ C. Here X(C) denotes the set of the codeword
with no more than Le erasures and no more than LFA erroneous colors over an
extended alphabet Σ∪{?}, where {?} is the erasure symbol. We derive the following
minimum distance conditions for c-TA(L,Nu; LFA, Le) [30]:
Let Γ be an (L,Nu, D)q-ECC, and c an integer. If









then Γ is c-TAq(L,Nu; LFA, Le). The proof can be found in Section 2.6.1.
As can be seen from the above discussions, the ECC based fingerprint code
prefers an ECC with larger minimum distance to tolerate more colluders. Among
ECC constructions, Reed-Solomon codes have the minimum distance that achieves
the Singleton bound [72] and is widely used in the existing coded fingerprinting
works [52, 56]. We can construct c-TA code using a Reed-Solomon code that
satisfies the above condition. The design can be simplified by treating erasures
as errors, which reflects the case of symbol extraction by such schemes as the
maximum correlation detector described in Section 2.3.3. This simplification leads
to the following results:
Among Reed-Solomon code with alphabet size q, there exists a c-TAq(L,Nu; LFA)
code with minimum distance






where the parameters satisfy
Nu = q
t, and t = 	L
c2




The detailed proof can be found in Section 2.6.1.
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In general, the decoding computational complexity of the c-TA code is O(Nu)
for a total of Nu codewords. For Reed-Solomon codes, or more generally algebraic-
geometry codes, there is a more efficient decoding method known as the list de-
coding, which can correct more errors than the decoding radius imposed by the
minimum distance. The list decoding algorithm can reduce the decoding complex-
ity to the order of polynomial in c log Nu [26, 44, 55]. However, as we will see in
the following section, when we take the embedding layer into consideration, the
demodulation process to extract the embedded symbols dominates the accounting
of the detection computational complexity. This also suggests the importance of
the joint consideration of coding and embedding.
2.4 Performance Analysis of ECC-based Finger-
printing
Examining the existing literature on ECC based fingerprinting reveals that few
work has actually taken into full consideration of the embedding layer of the fin-
gerprints. We have found a very limited amount of overall performance analysis
by considering the coding and embedding together [78], and little comparison with
non-coded orthogonal fingerprinting. Thus in this section, we first analyze the
computational complexity of the detection process and the efficient distribution
of ECC based fingerprinting. We then examine its collusion resistance through
measuring the probability of catching one colluder under different values of the
colluder number, and compare it with the performance of non-coded orthogonal
fingerprinting.
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2.4.1 Computational Complexity of Detection
As we have pointed out in the previous section, one of the reasons that researchers
in the literature may favor ECC based fingerprinting over the non-coded orthogonal
approach is because some classes of ECC have more efficient decoding algorithms
than the maximum likelihood decoding that is commonly used for orthogonal fin-
gerprinting [79]. By jointly considering the coding and embedding of ECC based
fingerprinting, we can obtain a complete picture on the computational complex-
ity for colluder identification, which consists of demodulation and decoding. We
shall show that while the efficient decoding improves the detection efficiency, the
improvement is a relatively small part in the overall computational complexity.
The major improvement on the detection efficiency comes from the demodulation
process.
For a fingerprinting system with a total of Nu users and a host signal with
totally N embeddable components, the detection of orthogonal fingerprinting is
done by correlating the test signal with each user’s fingerprint sequence. This
takes NuN multiplications plus Nu(N − 1) summations, or a total of O(NuN)
operations. We further perform Nu−1 comparisons to find the fingerprint sequence
corresponding to the highest correlation to identify one of the colluders. Thus the
computational complexity of the whole detection process is O(NuN) + O(Nu) =
O(NuN).
For ECC based fingerprinting, since the fingerprint sequences for each seg-
ment only have q different versions (corresponding to q symbols), we only need
qL(N/L) multiplications plus qL(N/L− 1) summations and L(q− 1) comparisons
for demodulation, giving a total computational complexity of O(qN). In the de-
coding step, we can determine the colluder through NuL + Nu− 1 comparisons by
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brute force searching, which provides an upper bound on the decoding complexity.
Putting the demodulation and decoding steps together, we find the computational
complexity for ECC based fingerprinting as O(qN) + O(NuL). In many practical
applications of robust fingerprinting, to ensure fingerprints be reliably embedded
in multimedia, we generally have Nu << N . This suggests that the demodulation
part dominates the overall complexity, regardless of the use of efficient decod-
ing algorithms. Therefore, the overall computational complexity becomes O(qN).
Similarly, the soft detector of Eqn.(2.6) with implementation of Eqn.(2.5) needs
O(qN) operations to calculate the partial correlations and further requires O(NuL)
summations and Nu − 1 comparisons to determine the colluder. This leads to the
same computational complexity bound of O(qN) as the hard detection. Taking a
Reed-Solomon code construction with Nu = q
t as an example, we obtain the bound
of detection computational complexity for ECC based fingerprinting as O( t
√
NuN).
Comparing the detection computational complexity of ECC based fingerprint-
ing and orthogonal fingerprinting, we can see that the significant improvement
on the demodulation process brings a substantial advantage of ECC based finger-
printing over the orthogonal fingerprinting. This is largely owing to the reduced
alphabet size in ECC based fingerprinting. Furthermore, we notice that ECC based
fingerprinting requires as few as q orthogonal sequences of length N/L, while the
orthogonal fingerprinting requires Nu mutually orthogonal sequences of length N .
This suggests that the ECC based system has an advantage of providing a more
compact way of representing users and consuming fewer resources in terms of the
orthogonal sequences. The compact representation of fingerprints allows for a sim-
pler design and implementation in the embedding and detection stages.
23
2.4.2 Efficient Distribution of Fingerprinted Signals
In some applications, such as video streaming, where a huge amount of data has
to be transmitted to a number of users in real time, the efficient generation and
distribution of fingerprinted copies for different users is an important issue. ECC
based fingerprinting provides a potential support for the efficient distribution of
the fingerprinted signal. This is because for a total of Nu users, every segment only
has q versions, each of which has one of the q possible symbols embedded. We can
pre-generate these q versions for each segment, which allows us to quickly construct
the fingerprinted copy for any given user by concatenating the corresponding seg-
ments according to his/her codeword. To distribute these fingerprinted copies, we
can employ secure multicast protocols such as that by Chu et al. [15]. Since for
each segment we send q copies, the bandwidth requirement on the sender side for
distributing Nu copies is qB, where B is the bandwidth requirement of sending
only one copy.
In contrast, for an orthogonal fingerprinting system, all users have different
versions at each segment. There is no structural advantage we can take in con-
structing and distributing the fingerprinted signals. The owner needs to generate
the whole fingerprinted signal for each user and to unicast one of the Nu versions
of the signals to each user, which generally requires a bandwidth of NuB.
We compare the communication cost of ECC based fingerprinting and orthog-
onal fingerprinting by defining γ as the ratio of the bandwidth consumption of
ECC based fingerprinting to that of orthogonal fingerprinting. From the above
discussion, we have γ = qB/(qtB) = q1−t. When the ECC based fingerprint-
ing is constructed based on a Reed-Solomon code, for example, with parameters
t = 2, q = 32, γ has value of 1/32. This suggests that the communication band-
24
width required by a sender employing ECC based fingerprinting can be one to two
orders of magnitude lower than that of orthogonal fingerprinting. If the commu-
nication cost requirement is more stringent than other parameters, we can further
adjust t to lower the cost.
2.4.3 Analysis of Collusion Resistance
Consider an ECC based fingerprinting system employing a L-tuple code with min-
imum distance D over q-ary alphabet to represent Nu users. Under the (symbol
wise) interleaving collusion, the colluders exploit the fingerprint pattern and con-
tribute segment by segment with each segment carrying one symbol. Averaging
collusion does not rely on the fingerprint pattern and simply takes the average
value of each signal component. As a result, these two collusion attacks have
different effects on collusion detection, and we shall analyze them separately.
Interleaving Collusion
During the interleaving collusion, colluders contribute their copies segment by
segment (or equivalently, symbol by symbol at the code level) with approximately
equal share. Further distortion may be applied on the colluded signal, which we
simplify as an additive white Gaussian noise. At the detector side, we consider
the soft detector employing matched-filter as in Eqn.(2.6). With this detector, we
skip the symbol detection as in hard detection, and directly identify the colluder
by correlating the test signal with every fingerprint sequence. The user whose
fingerprint sequence has the highest correlation is declared as colluder. As long as
the correlation between the fingerprint sequences is kept low, the performance of
the matched-filter decoding approaches that of the maximum likelihood decoding
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and provides an upper bound for the ECC based fingerprinting.
To facilitate further discussions, here we write down the expression of the
matched-filter detector again in Eqn.(2.10). For each user, we examine a correlation-
based statistic TN as
TN(j) =
(z− x)T sj√‖sj‖2 j = 1, ..., Nu, (2.10)
which follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution of Nu dimensions [50]. Here, sj




TN(j), T2 = max
j /∈SC
TN(j), (2.11)
where SC is the colluder set. For simplicity, we approximate T1 and T2 as indepen-
dent Gaussian variables. By examining the distribution of the correlations between
each fingerprint sequence and the test sequence, we can express the mean and the
variance of T1 and T2 as follows:
















mT2  E[T2] =
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where σ2d is the variance of the additive noise. Thus the probability of detection is
Pd = Pr(T1 > T2) =
∫ ∞
−∞
P (T1 > t)fT2(t)dt, (2.15)
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where fT2 is the p.d.f. of T2 and [19]
P (T1 > t) = 1−Q(t−mT1
σT1
). (2.16)
The detailed derivation is presented in Section 2.6.2.
Averaging Collusion
We employ the matched-filter detector in Eqn.(2.10) to analyze the probability of
detection under averaging collusion. To get an analytical approximation, we first
consider an ideal fingerprinting system whose fingerprint sequences have a constant
pairwise correlation, denoted as ρ. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the first c users contribute to collusion by performing averaging operations. The
vector of detection statistics TN ’s defined in Eqn.(2.10) follows an Nu-dimensional
Gaussian distribution:
T = [TN(1), ..., TN (Nu)]
T ∼ N([m1,m2]T , σ2dΣ), (2.17)




)ρ)1c, m2 = ‖s‖ρ1Nu−c,
where 1k is an all-1 vector with dimension k-by-1, Σ is an Nu-by-Nu matrix whose
diagonal elements are 1’s and off-diagonal elements are ρ’s, σ2d is the variance of the
noise, m1 is the mean vector for colluders, and m2 is the mean vector for innocent
users. Given the same colluder number c and fingerprint strength ‖s‖, the mean
correlation values with colluders and with innocents are separated more widely for
a smaller ρ. This suggests that in absence of any prior knowledge on collusion
pattern, a smaller ρ leads to a larger colluder detection probability Pd. Therefore,
we prefer fingerprint sequences with a small pairwise correlation ρ in the system
design.
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The pairwise correlation of ECC based fingerprinting can be calculated by
examining the code construction. Codes with a larger minimum distance have
a smaller upper bound on the correlation and thus are more preferable. This is
consistent with the principle indicated in Eqn.(2.7) to employ codes with a large
minimum distance. Under the code construction with a large minimum distance,
the largest pairwise correlation ρ0 between the fingerprinting sequences, which
corresponds to the codewords with minimum distance, will be close to 0. We
use the above equal pairwise correlation model with ρ = ρ0 to approximate the
performance of ECC based fingerprinting under averaging collusion.
Taking a Reed-Solomon code based fingerprinting as an example, we calculate
its pairwise correlation. For an L-tuple q-ary Reed-Solomon code with dimension
t, the total number of codewords is Nu = q
t and the minimum distance is D =
L − t + 1. We use si and sj to represent the fingerprint sequences for user i and
user j, respectively, and wik the orthogonal sequence representing the symbol in
user i’s codeword at position k with ‖wik‖ = ‖w‖. The normalized correlation
between si and sj is
< si, sj >
‖s‖2 =








We can choose t and L such that the correlation ρ0 is close to 0. By doing so, the
ECC based fingerprinting and the orthogonal fingerprinting should have compara-
ble resistance against averaging collusion.
Numerical results
In order to illustrate the collusion resistance derived from the above analysis, we
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(c) (d)
Figure 2.3: Analytical approximation of ECC-based fingerprinting under (a) inter-
leaving collusion; (b) averaging collusion; and orthogonal fingerprinting under (c)
interleaving collusion and (d) averaging collusion.
holding Nu users, the results in Eqn.(2.9) and (2.18) show that a larger L and a
smaller t are preferred in order to get better collusion resistance under interleaving
and averaging collusion. Because t can only take integer values, we take t = 2
to obtain a nontrivial Reed-Solomon code construction. This also determines q
since qt = Nu. On the other hand, larger L results in a smaller segment size for a
given host signal, which may lead to a higher error probability in symbol detection.
Typically a segment size of 1000 can provide reliable symbol detection. With an
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additional condition that L ≤ q, we choose L to be a number smaller than but close
to q. In our example considering a total of Nu = 1024 users and a host signal with
N = 3× 104 embeddable components, we choose L = 30 and use a Reed-Solomon
code with parameters of q = 32 and D = 29. According to Eqn.(2.7), the code
level alone can only assure resisting up to five users’ interleaving collusion; on the
other hand, the correlation between fingerprint sequences is only 0.03 according
to Eqn.(2.18), which suggests it should have similar performance to orthogonal
fingerprinting under averaging collusion.
We show the analytical approximation of Pd for the ECC based fingerprinting
under interleaving and averaging collusion with the above settings in Fig. 2.3(a)
and (b) respectively. The Watermark-to-Noise-Ratio (WNR) ranges from 0dB to
-20dB, which includes the scenarios from severe distortion to mild distortion. The
theoretical results for orthogonal fingerprinting from [71] are shown in Fig. 2.3(c)
and (d) for interleaving collusion and averaging collusion, respectively. Comparing
Fig. 2.3(b) and (d), we see that under averaging collusion, the orthogonal finger-
printing and the ECC based fingerprinting constructed above have similar colluder
identification performance. They both can resist at least a few dozens colluders’
averaging attack under high WNR and about half dozen’s under very low WNR.
This is consistent with the above analysis of the collusion resistance against av-
eraging collusion. Thus from colluders’ point of view, averaging collusion for an
ECC based fingerprinting system is not a very effective strategy. However, un-
der interleaving collusion, we observe from Fig. 2.3(a) and (c) a huge gap on the
collusion resistance between the two systems. For orthogonal fingerprinting, the
probability of colluder detection under interleaving collusion is the same as that
under averaging collusion owing to the orthogonal spreading; at WNR = 0dB, the
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Pd remains close to 1 when c is around a few dozens. On the other hand, the
detection probability of the ECC based fingerprinting drops sharply when more
than seven colluders come to create an interleaved copy, even when WNR is high.
Thus from colluders’ point of view, interleaving collusion is an effective strategy
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Figure 2.4: Simulation results of ECC based fingerprinting under (a) interleaving
collusion; (b) averaging collusion; and orthogonal fingerprinting under (c) inter-
leaving collusion and (d) averaging collusion.
To validate the analysis, we apply both systems to a host signal that is modelled
as an i.i.d. Gaussian sequence with length N = 3 × 104. This simple assumption
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on the host signal suits the fingerprinting applications well since the host signal
is often known to the detector, and its effect will be mostly removed by subtract-
ing it from the colluded signal. As such, the distribution of host signal does not
have a major effect on the detection performance. The detector in Eqn.(2.10) is
employed for both fingerprinting systems. We measure the probability of correctly
catching a colluder (Pd) for different values of colluder number c. The results of
200 iterations are shown in Fig. 2.4. Notice that the analytical approximation of
ECC based fingerprinting under interleaving collusion (Fig. 2.3(a)) is higher than
the measured value of Pd for large c. This is because the analysis in Eqn.(2.12)-
(2.14) considers the maximum number of matched symbols between the colluded
codeword and an innocent codeword as c(L − D). Using such an assumption to
estimate Pd becomes less accurate for large c. However, the analytical approxi-
mation captures the trend and provides an upper bound for the Pd of ECC based
fingerprinting under interleaving collusion. All other analytical results match well
with the simulation results. In summary, the simulation results verify the analyt-
ical approximation derived for interleaving collusion and averaging collusion, and
validate the conclusions drawn from the analytical results.
2.5 Chapter Summary
When designing a fingerprinting system, a better trade-off between the collusion
resistance and other performance measures, such as detection computational com-
plexity, is desired. Although orthogonal fingerprinting performs well in collusion
resistance, its detection computational complexity and distribution cost are expen-
sive as we have seen in Section 2.4.1 and 2.4.2. The significant computational and
distribution advantages of ECC based fingerprinting motivate us to find avenues to
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improve its collusion resistance, especially to reduce the performance gap between
the ECC based fingerprinting and orthogonal fingerprinting while preserving its
efficient detection and distribution. In the following two chapters, we identify two
directions for improving collusion resistance and propose two new techniques that
jointly consider coding and embedding of fingerprint, namely, Permuted Subseg-
ment Embedding and Group Based Joint Coding and Embedding (GRACE) finger-
printing.
2.6 Appendix: Derivations
2.6.1 Derivation of Inequality (2.8) and (2.9)
In this appendix section, we derive the minimum distance requirement of a c-
TAq(L,Nu; Le, LFA) code and the construction of such a code through Reed-
Solomon codes.
Let Γ be an ECC of length L with Nu codewords over an alphabet of size q, and
c an integer. If its minimum distance D satisfies









then Γ is c− TAq(L,Nu; Le, LFA).
Proof: Following the strategies by [52], for ω ∈ X(C), if |C| < c, then there exists
υi ∈ C such that υi and ω have at least (L − Le − LFA)/c in common. Here
X(C) denotes the set of the codeword with no more than Le erasures and no more
than LFA erroneous colors over an extended alphabet Σ ∪ {?}, where {?} is the
erasure symbol. Then the number of common symbols between υi and ω, defined
as λ(υi, ω), satisfies λ(υi, ω) ≥ (L − Le − LFA)/c. On the other hand, for any
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ϕ ∈ Γ \ C,
λ(ϕ, ω) ≤ λ(ϕ, υ1) + ... + λ(ϕ, υc) + LFA ≤ cλmax + LFA.
From (2.7), we have c2(L−D) + cLFA < L− Le − LFA. It follows that λ(ϕ, ω) ≤
cλmax + LFA ≤ λ(υi, ω). Thus υi can be identified correctly. 
For simplicity, we can treat the erasures as errors i.e. Le = 0, which reflects
the case of the maximum detector we considered in this thesis. Then we have the
following corollary for constructing c − TAq(L,Nu; LFA) code via Reed-Solomon
code.
Among Reed-Solomon code with alphabet size q, there exists a c−TAq(L,Nu; LFA)
code with minimum distance






where the total codeword number Nu = q




























From Eqn. (2.19), this code is a c− TAq(L,Nu; LFA) code. 
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2.6.2 Derivation of Eqns. (2.12)-(2.14)
In this appendix section, we presents the detailed derivation of the detection statis-
tic distribution under interleaving collusion.
Given the colluded signal z generated through interleaving followed by additive
white gaussian noise, we obtain the correlation-based statistic TN for each user as
TN(j) =
(z− x)T sj√‖sj‖ j = 1, ..., Nu, (2.21)
where x is the host signal, sj is the fingerprint signal of user j by concatenating
the fingerprint sequence corresponding to the symbols in user j’s codeword. TN(j)
follows a Gaussian distribution
TN(j) ∼ N(‖u‖
L
× (L− d(r, cj)), σ2d). (2.22)
Here, r is the extracted colluded codeword, cj is the codeword for user j, d(·, ·) is
the hamming distance metric, and ‖u‖ is the strength of the fingerprint sequence
corresponding to one symbol. From the modulation and embedding layer, all the
‖sj‖’s are the same and equal to
√




TN(j), T2 = max
j /∈SC
TN(j), (2.23)
where SC is the colluder set.
For simplicity, we approximate T1 and T2 using Gaussian distributions condi-











where MC = maxj∈SC (L − d(r, cj)) and MI = maxj /∈SC (L − d(r, cj)) indicate the
maximum number of matched symbols of colluded codeword with colluders’ code-
words and with innocent users’ codewords respectively. Notice that for MI , the
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maximum value is c(L − D) and minimum value is 1. Then we approximate the
mean and variance of MI as (c(L−D)+1)/2 and σ2I = ((c(L−D)−1)/6)2, respec-
tively. Similarly, the maximum value of MC is L/c+ (c− 1)(L−D) and minimum
value is L/c and we approximate its mean as L/c + β(c− 1)(L−D) and variance
as σ2C = (β(c − 1)(L − D)/3)2. β is set to a value less than 1/2, which reflects
the fact that lower values of the MC is more likely to happen than higher values.
Under these assumptions, we can further approximate T1 and T2 using Gaussian
distribution with means and variances calculated as follows:













m2 = E[T2] = EMI [E[T2|MI ]] =
‖u‖√
L
× c(L−D) + 1
2






with σ2I = (
c(L−D)− 1
6




where β is used to adjust the approximation. We examined several β values, and
choose β = 5/12 for a good approximation.
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Chapter 3
Joint Coding and Embedding
with Permuted Subsegment
Embedding
From Chapter 2, we have seen that coded fingerprinting has efficient detection
but rather low collusion resistance. In this Chapter, we explore avenues that can
both retain the advantages provided by the ECC-based fingerprinting and improve
the collusion resistance. We have observed that the existing ECC fingerprinting
works put most of the attention on the code layer and few work has considered the
interaction between coding and embedding. In the mean time, joint consideration
of coding and embedding has shown promising results recently in [64] for non-
segment based fingerprinting. This motivates us to examine the interplay between
the ECC code layer and the embedding layer. As we shall see, by employing a
strategic embedding mechanism referred to as the Permuted Subsegment Embed-
ding for putting the ECC fingerprint code into host media, we can benefit from
the joint consideration of coding and embedding for ECC-based fingerprinting and
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substantially improve its collusion resistance. Based on the proposed embedding
technique, we will further study how to choose fingerprinting codes to meet various
requirements on collusion resistance and detection efficiency.
3.1 Permuted Subsegment Embedding
3.1.1 The Proposed Embedding Method
We have observed from Section 2.4.3 a drastic difference in the collusion resistance
against averaging and interleaving collusions of ECC based fingerprinting. This
inspires us to look for an improved fingerprinting method, for which the interleaving
collusion would have a similar effect to averaging collusion. Careful examination on
the two types of collusion shows that the difference in the resistance against them
comes from the amount of role given to the embedding layer to play. The segment-
wise interleaving collusion is equivalent to the symbol-wise interleaving collusion
on the code level, since each colluded segment comes from just one user. The
collusion resilience primarily relies on what is provided by the code layer and almost
bypasses the embedding layer. Because of the limited alphabet size, the chance
for the colluders to interleave their symbols and to create a colluded fingerprint
close to the fingerprint of an innocent user is so high that it would require a large
minimum distance in the code design, if to handle this on the code level alone. This
means that either codes representing a given number of users can resist only a small
number of colluders, or codes can represent only a small total number of users. On
the other hand, for averaging collusion, every colluder contributes his/her share in
every segment. Through a correlation detector, the collection of such contribution
over the entire test signal leads to high expected correlation values when correlating
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with the fingerprints from the true colluders, and to low expected correlation values
when with the fingerprints from innocent users. In other words, the embedding
layer contributes to defending against the collusion. This suggests that more closely
considering the relation between fingerprint encoding, embedding, and detection
is helpful to improve the collusion resistance against interleaving collusion.
The basic idea of our improved algorithm is to prevent the colluders from
using the whole segment that carries one symbol as an interleaving unit and to
exploit the code-level limitation. We accomplish this by making each colluded
segment contain multiple colluders’ contribution. Our solution builds upon the
existing code construction and performs two important additional steps that we
collectively refer to as Permuted Subsegment Embedding [32]. As shown in Fig. 3.1,
consider as before a fingerprint signal generated by concatenating the appropriate
sequences corresponding to the symbols in a user’s codeword. We first partition
each segment of the fingerprint signal into β subsegments, giving a total of βL
subsegments. We then randomly permute these subsegments according to a secret
key to obtain the final fingerprint signal to represent the user. In detection, the
extracted fingerprint sequence is first inversely permuted and then the correlator
Eqn.(2.10) is applied to identify the colluder.
With subsegment partitioning and permutation, each colluded segment after
interleaving collusion most likely contains subsegments from multiple users. To
correlation-based detectors (including both hard and soft detection on the symbol
level), this would have a similar effect to what averaging collusion brings. Since
averaging collusion is far less effective from the colluders’ point of view, the per-
muted subsegment embedding can greatly improve the collusion resistance of ECC
based fingerprinting under interleaving collusion. Even if the colluders know the
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Figure 3.1: Illustration of the permutated subsegment embedding for ECC based
fingerprinting: (a) the conventional ECC based fingerprinting, (b) the proposed
scheme.
actual size of a segment or a subsegment, the permutation unknown to them pre-
vents them from creating a colluded signal with the equivalent effect of symbol
interleaving in the code domain.
3.1.2 Detection Analysis against Interleaving Collusion
Consider an ECC-based fingerprinting on a code [L, t,D] with code length L, di-
mension t and minimum distance D. Each symbol is mapped to a spreading
sequence with strength ‖u‖. After the permuted subsegment embedding with β,
each fingerprint sequence consists of βL subsegments, and each subsegment has
strength ‖u‖/β. Notice that after permuted subsegment embedding, the colluders
cannot identify which subsegment corresponds to which symbol even if they know
the segment size. Thus, permuted subsegment embedding has the effect that it
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forces colluders to perform interleaving collusion using subsegments. In the follow-
ing analysis, we take this observation and approximate the collusion strategy as
subsegment-wised interleaving collusion, under which, the permutation does not
affect the results.
Denote the colluded fingerprint sequence as y which is generated by subsegment-
wise interleaving from c colluders plus an additive Gaussian noise n with mean 0
and variance σd, i.e.
y = ITL(s1, s2, ..., sc) + n, (3.1)
where ITL denotes the subsegment-wise interleaving collusion. Without loss of
generality, we assume the first c colluders perform collusion attack.
We employ correlation based detection as we mentioned earlier in Chapter 2,
i.e.
TN(j) =
(z− x)T sj√‖sj‖2 j = 1, ..., Nu. (3.2)
TN follows a Gaussian distribution for both colluders and innocent users with
different mean values, i.e.,
T = N([m1,m2], Σ) (3.3)
where m1 and m2 are the mean values for colluder and innocent user, respec-
tively, and they are determined by the matches between the colluded signal (be-
fore applying additive noise) and colluders’(innocents’) users. In a fair subseg-
ment interleaving collusion, the colluders contribute approximately equal amount
of subsegments and thus one colluder contributes βL/c subsegments on average.
Besides the contributed segments, matches may also come from the shared seg-
ments among the codewords. For a [L, t,D] code, there are maximum of L − D
matches between codewords for L symbols. Then for (βL − βL/c) symbols,
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there are (βL − βL/c)(L − D)/L matches on average. Thus we arrive at
βL/c+ (L−D)/L(βL−βL/c) matches between the colluded codeword and
user i’s codeword. For an innocent user j, the matches only come from the code
itself, it would be ((L−D)/L)Lβ.
The variance matrix Σ can be derived as follows:
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In summary, the detection statistic TN follows Nu dimension Gaussian distri-
bution:
T ∼ N([mITL1 ,mITL2 ], Σ) (3.6)
















Recall that under averaging collusion, the detection statistic follows the distribu-
tion
T = [TN(1), ..., TN (Nu)]
T ∼ N([mAV G1 ,mAV G2 ]T , σ2dΣ), (3.9)








where ρ = L−D
L
. We can see that as β increase, TN approaches the distribution
under averaging collusion. This can be shown through the following example. We
take the Reed-Solomon Code [L, t,D] = [30, 2, 29] and consider c = 25. Under
averaging collusion, mAV G1 = 2.16‖s‖/30 · 1c,mAV G2 = ‖s‖/30 · 1Nu−c. Under
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interleaving collusion, mITL2 = ‖s‖/30 · 1Nu−c for any β value, which is the same
as that under averaging collusion. We denote mITL1 = A‖s‖/L · 1c. Then it is
sufficient to examine the coefficient A under different β values and compare it







))/β = 1. We summarize the results for other β values
in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Coefficient A values for different β
β 1 2 4 5 10 ... 1000
A 1 1.5 1.75 2 2.1 ... 2.16
We can see that the parameter β controls the “approximation” level of the
effect of interleaving collusion to that of averaging collusion. Larger β provides
a finer granularity in subsegment division and permutation. Thus each segment
may contain subsegments from more colluders, leading to better approximation
and better collusion resistance. We verify this relation by building an improved
ECC based fingerprinting system with different β values upon the experiment setup
in Section 2.4.3. That is, we choose Reed-Solomon code of length 30, dimension 2
and minimum distance 29 for fingerprint construction. The host signal length is
10,000. Fig. 3.2 shows the results when a total of c = 25 colluders perform segment-
wise interleaving with WNR = 0dB. We can see that higher β indeed gives higher
detection probability Pd. On the other hand, a larger β may incur higher compu-
tational complexity in permutation. Thus a tradeoff should be made according to
the requirements of a specific application. Notice that for the particular system
we examined in Fig. 3.2, the improvement on the detection probability saturates
when β > 5. Therefore, we choose β = 5 for this system in later experiments to
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Figure 3.2: Probability of catching one colluder Pd versus β for c = 25 and WNR
= 0dB of the proposed scheme.
obtain a good trade-off between the permutation computational complexity and
the detection performance improvement.
3.1.3 Experimental Results
We evaluate the performance of the improved system with β = 5 under various
WNRs, and show the results in Fig. 3.3(a) for segment-wise interleaving collusion.
For comparison, we show the performance of the conventional ECC based finger-
printing under segment-wise interleaving collusion in Fig. 3.3(c). We can see that
the detection probability of the proposed system is substantially improved over the
conventional ECC based fingerprinting system under the same interleaving collu-
sion. Under around two dozens users’ collusion, the probability of detection Pd
increases to up to four times of that for the conventional ECC based fingerprinting
at high and moderate WNRs. In the meantime, the gap between the performance
of the proposed system in Fig. 3.3(a) and that of the orthogonal fingerprinting in
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Fig. 2.4(c) is very small.
Next, Fig. 3.3(b) shows the results for interleaving collusion using subsegment
as a unit. We observe from Fig. 3.3(a) and (b) that when many users come to-
gether to perform interleaving collusion (i.e. for large c), the performance of the
proposed system is a little worse when the interleaving is done using a subsegment
as a unit than that when using a segment as a unit. This is because the probability
that one segment contains only one colluder’s trace after subsegment interleaving
and inverse permutation is a little higher than that after segment interleaving. As
we have pointed out earlier, one segment containing more colluders’ information
after the collusion leads to a higher performance in colluder detection. As such
the collusion resistance against subsegment interleaving is slightly worse than that
against segment interleaving. Overall the proposed system has similar performance
under two types of interleaving collusion and gives a high detection probability for
up to two dozens colluders at moderate to high WNR. Since the permuted subseg-
ment embedding does not affect the performance of the system under averaging
collusion, the Pd under averaging collusion remains unchanged. We can see that
the proposed system based on the joint consideration of the fingerprint coding and
embedding has effectively improved the collusion resistance.
3.1.4 Discussions
The Role of Permutation
Random permutation is a useful technique that has found quite a few applications
in data embedding. It was used in image watermarking to equalize the uneven
embedding capacity [75], and was applied to a simple staircase construction of




































































(c)            
(c)
Figure 3.3: Collusion resistance of the improved ECC based fingerprinting with
permuted subsegment embedding technique under (a) segment-wise and (b)
subsegment-wise interleaving collusion; (c) Collusion resistance of the conventional
ECC based fingerprinting under interleaving collusion.
we employ random permutation to make each segment after interleaving collusion
contain multiple colluders’ information, thus mimicking the effect of averaging
collusion and improving the collusion resistance against interleaving collusion.
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Computational Complexity of Fingerprint Detection and Efficient Dis-
tribution
The detection of the improved ECC based fingerprinting using permuted subseg-
ment embedding consists of three steps: inverse permutation, demodulation by
correlation, and decoding to certain colluder. The computational complexity of
the inverse permutation is O(βL). As we have analyzed in Section 2.4.1, the other
two steps need at most O(qN) computations. Thus the improved ECC fingerprint-
ing has complexity of O(βL) + O(qN). Since the largest possible value of βL is
the total number of the embeddable components N , the demodulation step still
dominates the overall complexity. Therefore, the overall computational complexity
remains at O(qN).
Notice that in the improved ECC based fingerprinting, for each subsegment,
there are only q different versions. The efficient distribution of fingerprinted sig-
nal discussed earlier for ECC based fingerprinting is still applicable here except
that the multicast becomes subsegment based instead of segment based. While
the bandwidth efficiency (in terms of the cost ratio γ defined earlier) remains
unchanged, the multicast groups have to be updated when transmitting each sub-
segment [48]. The more subsegments (or larger β) we have, the more frequently we
have to switch the multicast grouping. This overhead should be taken into account
when choosing β.
Comparison Criteria
The results in Fig. 3.3 show that the proposed permuted subsegment embedding
provides significant collusion resistance improvement for ECC based fingerprinting
with only a small increase of computation and distribution cost. Moreover, differ-
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ent user-capacity requirements can be accommodated by preserving the alphabet
size and adjusting the dimension of the ECC. For Reed-Solomon code, this can
be done by adjusting the dimension parameter t. We summarize in Table 3.2 the
collusion resistance, detection and distribution efficiency for three fingerprinting
systems, namely, ECC based fingerprinting (“ECC FP” in short), improved ECC
based fingerprinting with permuted subsegment embedding, and orthogonal fin-
gerprinting (“Orth FP” in short). Overall, the improved ECC based fingerprinting
provides a better tradeoff among these three criteria over the conventional schemes,
and offers flexibility to accommodate different application requirements.
Table 3.2: Performance Comparison of Fingerprinting Systems

































Distr. Efficiency γ 1 q1−t q1−t
It is worth noting that the comparison that we have seen is the resistance
against averaging collusion and interleaving collusion at the same WNR. Under
such settings, we have found that interleaving collusion is a more effective attack
than averaging collusion. We thus focus on improving the system’s resistance
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against interleaving collusion, and propose the permuted subsegment embedding
technique to bring similar performance against both types of collusions. Another
possible comparison setting is to keep the same Mean Square Error (MSE) of the
colluded signal with respect to the original signal for both types of collusions.
Notice that for fingerprint sequences with small correlation, averaging operation
brings the colluded signal (before additive noise and other further distortions)
close to the original signal. As such, for the same level of overall MSE distortion,
averaging collusion allows stronger noise to be added than interleaving collusion
does. In this sense, averaging collusion may become more effective than interleav-
ing collusion after permuted subsegment embedding, especially when the number
of colluders is large. The detailed colluder tracing results under this alternative
setting can be obtained by mapping the WNR in Fig. 3.3 to the corresponding
MSE distortion.
3.2 The Effect of Code Parameters on Finger-
printing Performance
We have seen from the previous section that the proposed permuted subsegment
embedding substantially improves the collusion resistance of coded fingerprinting.
With this improvement, coded fingerprinting has a better trade-off between col-
lusion resistance and detection efficiency than the non-coded fingerprinting. One
question that remains to be answered is the effect of the code parameters on
the performance of the fingerprinting systems. In this section, building upon the
cross-layer framework and employing our proposed permuted subsegment embed-
ding technique, we examine the performance of different fingerprint codes, that
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have tracing capability and are able to resist collusion. We collectively call these
codes traceability codes. The term of “traceability codes”, as will be discussed
later, also refers to a specific type of traceability codes with the property that the
colluded codeword has smaller distance to one of the guilty codewords than any
other innocent codeword. To avoid confusion, in this section, we will use “TA
codes” to represent this type of traceability codes.
3.2.1 Traceability Codes
In the literatures of fingerprint code design, codes such as Identifiable Parent Prop-
erty(IPP) codes and Traceability(TA) codes are widely studied [5,13,14,52,56,65,
66]. We briefly review these two kinds of codes in the following.
c-TA Code
A c-TA code satisfies the condition that any colluded codeword by any c (or fewer)
colluders has a smaller distance to at least one of these colluders’ codewords than
to the innocent users’ [56]. We can construct a c-TA code using an established
Error Correcting Code (ECC), provided that the minimum distance D is large







Here L is the code length and c is the number of colluders that the code is intended
to resist. With the minimum distance achieving the Singleton bound, a Reed-
Solomon code is a natural choice for constructing a c-TA code. Then, the number
of c-TA codewords over an alphabet of size q constructed through a Reed-Solomon
code is Nu = q




A c-IPP code satisfies the condition that any colluded codeword by a coalition of
size at most c can be traced back to at least one member of the coalition [56].
A c-TA code is a c-IPP code, but a c-IPP code is not necessarily a c-TA code.
Therefore, the set of c-TA codes is a subset of c-IPP codes. In terms of the
traceability, the c-TA codes are stronger than those c-IPP codes that are not c-TA
codes, which we call proper c-IPP codes. Van Trung et al. propose a method that
can be used to construct a proper c-IPP code as follows [65]:
Let A be an (L2, N2, q2) c-IPP code with code length L2, codeword number
N2 and alphabet size q2. Let B be an (L1, q2, q1) c-IPP code with code
length L1, codeword number q2 and alphabet size q1. Then the concatenated
code C of A and B is an (L1L2, N2, q1) c-IPP code with code length L1L2,
codeword number N2 and alphabet size q1.
The concatenation of code A and code B is done by replacing each symbol in the
alphabet of code A by a codeword in code B. Since a c-TA code is also a c-IPP
code, the construction of a proper c-IPP code can be done by concatenating two
c-TA codes.
In this section, we are interested in the comparison of c-TA codes with proper
c-IPP codes. From this point on, for the sake of brevity we use the term c-IPP











































































































2−IPP and 2−TA code based FP under Interleaving Collusion at WNR = −12dB
2−TA
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Figure 3.4: Simulation results for IPP codes and TA codes based fingerprinting
systems: the performance of 2-IPP code based system under (a) interleaving col-
lusion and (b) averaging collusion; the performance of 2-TA code based system
under (c) interleaving collusion and (d) averaging collusion. The performance




c-IPP codes versus c-TA codes
Inequality (3.10) shows the sufficient condition for a code to be a c-TA code, and







and combining it with Eqn.(2.18), we can see that a c-TA code has pairwise corre-
lation ρ0 < 1/c
2, while c-IPP code has pairwise correlation ρ0 > 1/c
2. According
to the analysis in Section 2.4.3, the fingerprinting system constructed on c-TA code
should have better performance than the fingerprinting system employing c-IPP
code.
To validate the analysis, we examine the performance of a c-IPP code based
fingerprinting system and a c-TA code based fingerprinting system through simu-
lation. For a host signal with length N = 40, 000, we design two systems that are
capable of holding Nu = 256 users as follows:
• System 1 is built upon a 2-IPP code (40,256,4) with code length L=40,
codeword number Nu = 256 and alphabet size q=4. This 2-IPP code is
constructed through the concatenation of two 2-TA Reed-Solomon codes
(8,256,16) and (5,16,4) following the method proposed in [65]. The pairwise
correlation of the fingerprint sequences ρ0 is 0.3 according to Eqn. (2.18).
• System 2 is built upon a 2-TA Reed-Solomon code (8,256,16) with code
length L=8, codeword number Nu = 256 and alphabet size q=16. The
pairwise correlation ρ0 is 0.14.
In both systems, we employ our proposed permuted subsegment embedding tech-
nique and choose the same subsegment size 200 for permutation. We examine
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the probability of catching one colluder Pd of both systems against interleaving
collusion and averaging collusion with colluder number c ranging from 2 to 30
and Watermark-to-Noise-Ratio(WNR) ranging from -20dB to 0dB. The simula-
tion results are shown in Fig. 3.4. For ease of comparison, we show the case of
WNR=−12dB in Fig. 3.4(e) and (f). From the results, we can see that under
averaging collusion (Fig. 3.4(b), (d) and (f)) 2-TA code based System 1 has 8%
gain in the probability of detection Pd. Under interleaving collusion (Fig. 3.4(a),
(c) and (e)), the performance gain can be up to 30%. The results are consistent
with our analysis that due to the low pairwise correlation among the fingerprint
sequences, 2-TA code based system outperforms 2-IPP code based system in all
the cases we examined.
c-TA codes with different parameters
From the above comparison results, we can see that the fingerprint sequences
constructed based on a c-TA code have lower correlation than the sequences con-
structed based on a c-IPP code. This low correlation helps defending against
collusion attacks. A TA code is thus preferred in designing the fingerprint se-
quences. A natural question is that, given a host signal and the number of users
the system needs to hold, how should we choose the parameters of TA codes to
achieve good collusion resistance.
In the following, we consider TA codes constructed on Reed-Solomon codes over
alphabet size of q with dimension t. Examining Eqn. (2.18) we find that in order
to get a small ρ0, we can decrease t and increase L. In order to meet the desired
number of users Nu and reduce the dimension t, larger q is preferred. Moreover,





























































































































Figure 3.5: Simulation results for systems with different code parameters under
collusion attacks: System 3 under (a) Interleaving Collusion and (b) Averaging
Collusion; System 4 under (c) Interleaving Collusion and (d) Averaging Collusion;
System 5 under (e) Interleaving Collusion and (f) Averaging Collusion.
55









































































Figure 3.6: Simulation results for systems with different code parameters under
interleaving and averaging collusion at WNR = 0dB and -8dB. (a) Interleaving
Collusion with WNR = 0dB; (b) Averaging Collusion with WNR = 0dB; (c) In-
terleaving Collusion with WNR = -8dB and (d) Averaging Collusion with WNR
= -8dB
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order to get larger L, a larger q is also preferred. Therefore, our conjecture is that
the fingerprinting system constructed on a TA code with a larger alphabet size q
and a longer code length L should have better collusion resistance.
To validate our analysis, we examine the collusion resistance of the systems
with various parameters through simulations. We construct three fingerprinting
systems as follows:
• System 3 is built upon a TA code (15, 4096, 16) with code length L =
15, codeword number Nu = 4096 and alphabet size q = 16. According to
Eqn. (2.18), the pairwise correlation ρ0 is 0.13.
• System 4 is built upon a TA code (14, 4096, 64) with code length L =14,
codeword number Nu=4096 and alphabet size q =64. The pairwise correla-
tion ρ0 is 0.07.
• System 5 is built upon a TA code (62, 4096, 64) with code length L =62,
codeword number Nu=4096 and alphabet size q =64. The pairwise correla-
tion ρ0 is 0.016.
System 3 and System 4 have approximately the same code length but different
alphabet size. System 4 and System 5 have the same alphabet size but different
code lengths. All the systems are designed to protect a host signal with length
N = 15, 000 and to accommodate Nu = 4096 users. We employ the permuted sub-
segment embedding technique for the fingerprint embedding, and a subsegment size
of 50 is chosen for the permutation. We examine the probability of catching one
colluder Pd of all three systems against interleaving collusion and averaging collu-
sion, with colluder number c ranging from 2 to 20 and WNR ranging from -20dB to
0dB. We show the simulation results in Fig. 3.5, where the results for WNR = 0dB
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and -8dB cases are shown separately in Fig. 3.6 for better illustration. Comparing
System 3 and System 4, we observe that under averaging collusion (Fig. 3.6(b)
and (d)) System 4 with a larger alphabet size has 8% gain in the probability of
detection Pd. The performance gain under interleaving collusion (Fig. 3.6(a) and
(c)) can be as high as 40%. The comparison of System 3 and System 4 shows that
with the same code length and the same subsegment permutation, the system with
a larger alphabet size has better performance. Comparing System 4 and System
5, we can see that under both averaging and interleaving collusions, System 5 has
about a 5% performance gain due to a longer code length. This small performance
gain is because in this particular experimental settings, the pairwise correlations
of both System 4 and 5 are very small and close to 0. There is little room for
the improvement brought about by the smaller pairwise correlation of System 5.
The simulation results of all three systems are consistent with our analysis in Sec-
tion 2.4.3 in that TA codes with larger alphabet size q and longer code length L
result in fingerprint sequences with smaller pairwise correlation, and thus better
collusion resistance.
3.2.3 Discussions
The above results show that larger q and L values are preferred in code construc-
tion. However, q and L cannot be chosen arbitrarily. There are several constraints
on them depending on the code constructions. Specifically, for the Reed-Solomon
code construction, we have following constraints:
System requirement on the total user number: q = t
√
Nu; (3.11)
Reed-Solomon code construction constraint: L ≤ q + 1; (3.12)




where N is the host signal length, Nu is the total number of users, q is the alphabet
size and L is the code length. Taking L as the maximum value q + 1, we get from
(3.13) that
q(q + 1) ≤ N ; (3.14)
which means the upper bound of q value is roughly on the order of
√
N . Usually,
in multimedia fingerprinting the host signal length N >> Nu and t ≥ 2 for Reed-
Solomon codes. Therefore, Eqn. (3.11) is a more stringent requirement on q. In
Eqn. (3.11), the dimension t can be used to achieve the desired trade-off between
the collusion resistance and the computational complexity in detection which is
O(qN) according to Section 3.1.4. For example, in applications where the detection
computation resources are very limited, we can first choose a small q to achieve a
low complexity detection and then adjust t value to reach a large user capacity.
On the other hand, if the detection complexity is not a major concern, the system
designer can fix t to be 2 and q =
√
Nu to minimize the correlation for high
collusion resistance. We can see that these parameters provide a tradeoff between
collusion resistance and efficiency, and they should be chosen according to the
priority of various design requirements. Notice that the extreme case of t = 1
reduces to orthogonal fingerprinting which has better collusion resistance but high
computational complexity in detection [32].
Other c-TA code constructions can be analyzed in a similar way. It is worth
mentioning that the TA code proposed in [66] can be regarded as a TA code with
dimension t lying between 1 and 2, which offers a fine adjustment on the trade-off
between the collusion resistance and detection efficiency.
59
3.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we focus on improving the collusion resistance of the ECC based
fingerprinting while retaining its advantages in detection complexity and fast dis-
tribution. We have discovered a gap in the collusion resistance of ECC based
fingerprinting between the averaging and interleaving collusions. Our analysis on
the gap suggests a great need of jointly considering the coding, embedding, and
detection issues, and inspires to the proposed technique of permuted subsegment
embedding. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed technique can
substantially improve the collusion resistance of ECC based fingerprinting, while
inheriting the advantage in detection complexity and efficient distribution.
Based on the proposed technique, we then examine the collusion resistance
of the coded fingerprinting. The results show that for a given host signal the
pairwise correlation among fingerprint sequences is a key indicator of the collusion
resistance, the lower the correlation the higher the collusion resistance. According
to this principle, c-TA codes can be used to introduce a lower correlation among
fingerprint sequences and thus is preferred over c-IPP codes in fingerprint design.
Furthermore, a TA code with a larger alphabet size and a longer code length can
provide better collusion resistance. The fingerprinting code construction provides
a systematic way to introduce the correlation and to achieve a desired trade-off
between the collusion resistance and detection efficiency.
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Chapter 4
GRACE: Group Based Joint
Coding and Embedding
Our second joint coding and embedding technique is rooted from the observation
that a user is often not equally likely to collude with other users in practice. For
example, users in the same geographic area or having similar social or cultural
background may be more likely to collude. Taking advantage of this prior knowl-
edge, Wang et al. proposed group-oriented fingerprinting to enhance the collusion
resistance of non-coded orthogonal fingerprinting [70]. In their work, users are put
into groups according to the group collusion behavior, and each user’s fingerprint
consists of two parts of information identifying each individual user as well as the
group he/she is in. The group information is used in the detection to narrow down
the suspicious user set. Such kind of prior knowledge on the collusion pattern has
not been exploited in the coded fingerprinting, where new issues arise, such as how
to group users and how to construct and embed the group information and user
information.
In the meantime, the results in the Chapter 2 suggest that the performance of
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the conventional ECC based fingerprinting is mainly restricted by the code struc-
ture especially for high WNR where the symbol detection from the embedding layer
has high accuracy. For example, we see from Fig. 2.4(a) that as WNR increases
from -20dB to 0dB, the detection probability of the ECC based fingerprinting only
increases 0.1-0.15 compared with the huge increase of 0.7-0.8 in orthogonal finger-
printing. Based on this observation, it is possible to use part of the fingerprint
energy to embed group information to facilitate the colluder detection, while keep-
ing the symbol detection accuracy high enough. We thus propose the Group Based
Joint Coding and Embedding (GRACE) fingerprinting system [31]. In the GRACE
fingerprinting, we construct the fingerprint sequence by superposing the sequences
for the group information and the user codeword. This combined fingerprint is
spread over the host signal during embeddding. As we shall see, this joint coding
and embedding significantly improves the collusion resistance of the ECC based
fingerprinting.
4.1 Incorporating Grouping in Coded Fingerprint-
ing
4.1.1 Fingerprint Construction and Embedding
We partition the codewords in ECC based fingerprinting into groups to capture
the collusion pattern, and assign symbols to each group to represent the group in-
formation. We call these group symbols “group subcode”, and refer to the symbols
for distinguishing individual users as “user subcode”. Thus each user’s fingerprint
consists of two parts, namely, user subcode and group subcode.
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Algorithm 1 Group construction in GRACE fingerprinting
1: Set the group index i = 1, initialize the set of codewords for group i to be
empty, G(i) = ∅;
2: Pick any codeword c ∈ C to be the first element for group i, move it from C
to group i: G(i) = {G(i), c}, C ← C − {c};
3: Examine every codeword in C: If c ∈ C is orthogonal to all the existing
codewords in G(i), move c from C to G(i);
4: If C = ∅, continue to build the next group. Set i← i + 1, initialize G(i) = ∅,
and go to step 2.
Subcode Construction
To construct the user subcode, we start with a c-TA code based on error correcting
code construction over an alphabet of size q as discussed in Chapter 2. The code
length is L, and the minimum distance is D and typically less than L. We then
rearrange the codebook into groups so that within each group, the codewords are
orthogonal to each other, i.e. users within the group have distinct values at each
symbol position. Thus the code distance within a group equals the codeword
length L. We assign one codeword to each user as his/her user subcode. This
process is illustrated in Fig. 4.1 and described in more detail in Algorithm 1.
Other construction of orthogonal subcodes is also possible, for example, through a
systematic coding technique known as Mutually Orthogonal Latin Squares(MOLT)
[66].
Next, we construct the group subcodes. To make group information as separate
as possible and thus facilitate accurate identification of guilty groups, we design
the group subcodes to be orthogonal to each other. A simple way to construct the








User subcode 11  
User subcode 12 
… … 
 … … 
User subcode 1n1
Dgmin =  L
User subcode g1  
User subcode g2 
… … 
















Figure 4.1: Fingerprint codeword construction for GRACE fingerprinting.
a total of g symbols for g groups. For each group, we construct repetition code
with length L by repeating the symbol L times as the group subcode.
Fingerprint Embedding
In the proposed GRACE fingerprinting scheme, we embed both group subcode
and user subcode by mapping them to spreading sequences and then adding the
superposition of the two corresponding spreading sequences to the host signal.
The group information of the GRACE fingerprinting is orthogonal to the spread-
ing sequence conveying the user subcode, yet their supports overlap in the signal
sample domain [73]. More specifically, we use the sequences {uj, j = 1, ..., q} to
represent q symbol values in the alphabet of user subcode, where uj’s are orthogo-
nal to each other and have identical energy ||u||2. The g sequences {ai, i = 1, ..., g}
represent g groups. They are orthogonal to each other and to {uj}, and have the
same energy as uj’s, i.e. ‖a‖2 = ‖u‖2. We then construct the fingerprint sequence
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for the kth segment of user j who belongs to group i as
sijk =
√
1− ρusym(j,k) +√ρai, (4.1)
where the function sym(j, k) is used to retrieve the symbol for the kth segment
from the jth user’s subcode, and ρ is used to adjust the relative energy between
the group subcode and user subcode. This fingerprint signal is finally added to the
kth segment of the host signal. A larger ρ puts more energy on group information
and thus provides a more accurate detection of group information. However, a
larger ρ also reduces the detection accuracy of user subcode and makes it harder
to narrow down to the true colluder. Therefore, there is a trade-off between group
detection and user detection when choosing ρ. Since in our scheme we have L
segments to collect the energy for group detection, and usually collusion happens
among a small number of groups, we can choose a small ρ to satisfy the detection
performance requirement on both user information and group information.
We can see that a key design issue in the GRACE fingerprinting is on how to
represent and embed the group information versus the user information. Our ap-
proach is to superpose the spreading sequences of group subcode and user subcode
for embedding. Alternatively, the group information may be embedded by append-
ing the spreading sequence of group subcode to that of user subcode. To demon-
strate the performance gain of the GRACE fingerprinting brought by the joint con-
sideration of coding and embedding, we shall present this appending scheme as well
and refer to it as the group ECC fingerprinting by appending. In this alternative
fingerprinting scheme, the equivalent codeword for each user is the concatenation
of the user subcode with length L and the group subcode with length Lg, where
Lg is not necessarily equal to L and is used to adjust the relative energy between
the group subcode and the user subcode. The total codeword length is L + Lg.
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To embed this codeword, the host signal is partitioned into L + Lg segments. The
corresponding spreading sequence is added into each segment according to the
codeword symbols. For a given host signal where the total number of embeddable
signal samples N is fixed, the longer the group subcode is, the smaller the length
of each segment N ′s = N/(L + Lg) is.
4.1.2 Fingerprint Detection
At the detector side, the embedded group information can be used to facilitate the
detection by a two-level detection scheme. First, we examine through a correlation
detector the group information in the colluded signal to identify the groups from
which the colluders come. We then focus our attention on these identified suspi-
cious groups and apply matched-filter detection for ECC-based fingerprinting as
discussed in Section 2.3 on the user subcode to narrow down to the true colluders.
More specifically, we extract group information from the colluded signal z using
a non-blind correlation detector. The detection statistic with respect to group i is
TG(i) =
(z− x)Tbi
‖b‖ , i = 1, 2, ..., g, (4.2)
where x is the host signal, and bi is the concatenation of the spreading sequences
representing group i’s information from each segment. In the above settings, bTi =
[aTi ...a
T
i ] since we embed ai in each segment of group i. The k
th group is considered
guilty for the test signal if TG(k) > h, where h is the threshold. In this work, we
choose the threshold to be adaptive, i.e. h = γ maxk=1,...,g TG(k), where γ is a
parameter to adjust the threshold. The details of the adaptive detection will be
presented in Section 4.3. The union of the detected groups forms a suspicious
group set. To narrow down to the true colluders inside the suspicious groups,
we employ the soft detector in Eqn.(2.6) to correlate the test signal with each
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user’s fingerprint sequence and identify the one with the highest correlation as the
colluder.
The detection for the group ECC fingerprinting by appending is a two-stage
process similar to GRACE fingerprinting. We first extract the group information
from the segments corresponding to group subcode through a non-blind correlation
detector. The decoding to a specific colluder is then conducted on the segments
for user subcode within the extracted suspicious groups.
4.1.3 Experimental Results
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed GRACE finger-
printing through experiments. To build the user subcode, we employ a Reed-
Solomon code with q = 32, L = 30, Nu = 1024, D = 29, and rearrange it into 32
groups using the algorithm described in Section 4.1.1. Inside each group, there are
32 codewords mutually orthogonal to each other. We choose ρ = 1/7 in Eqn.(4.1)
to generate the fingerprint signal from the user subcode and the group subcode in
GRACE. For fair comparison, we choose Lg = 5 for the group ECC fingerprinting
by appending in order to provide the same relative energy between user subcode
and group subcode as that of GRACE. We use the repetition code described in Sec-
tion 4.1.1 as the group subcode, and construct i.i.d. Gaussian signals with 3× 104
signal samples to emulate the host signal.
Interleaving collusion and averaging collusion are applied to all three systems,
namely, the ECC based fingerprinting, the GRACE fingerprinting and the group
ECC fingerprinting by appending. We examine the probability of successfully
detecting one colluder (Pd) at WNR = 0dB in the following three scenarios:
1) Collusion within a small number of groups: In this case, our grouping
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correctly reflects the collusion pattern that all the colluders come from a small
number of groups. In our simulation, all colluders are from 2 out of 32 groups, and
they are randomly distributed between these two groups. The results of Pd under
interleaving collusion and averaging collusion are shown in Fig. 4.2(a) and (b),
respectively. Under interleaving collusion, we can see that for the same number
of colluders, the Pd’s for the proposed GRACE and the group ECC fingerprinting
by appending are similar, and they have up to 0.7 improvement over that of the
conventional ECC based fingerprinting. From another point of view, if we require
the Pd of the system to be no less than a given value, say 0.98, the number of
colluders that the system can resist can be improved from 6 colluders (for con-
ventional ECC based fingerprinting) to 18 colluders (for the proposed GRACE
fingerprinting). Under the averaging collusion, all systems have Pd close to 1 for
the examined c values, but we still can see 0.02 improvement on Pd brought by
GRACE fingerprinting over the conventional ECC fingerprinting.
2) Colluders randomly distribute across all groups: In this case, the group-
ing does not capture the collusion pattern. The colluders randomly distribute
across all groups. The results under interleaving and averaging collusion are shown
in Fig. 4.2(c) and (d), respectively. Under interleaving collusion, the proposed
GRACE fingerprinting has up to 0.3 improvement on Pd over the conventional
ECC fingerprinting, while the alternative technique of group ECC fingerprinting
by appending performs a little worse than the conventional ECC fingerprinting.
Under averaging collusion, the proposed GRACE fingerprinting has comparable
performance with the ECC based fingerprinting.
3) Colluders come from distinct groups: In this case, the grouping knowledge
is extremely inaccurate. All the colluders come from distinct groups (i.e. the num-
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Figure 4.2: Performance comparison of the proposed GRACE fingerprinting, group
ECC fingerprinting by appending and the conventional ECC fingerprinting in terms
of probability of detection Pd versus the colluder number c at WNR = 0dB.
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ber of groups equals the number of colluders c). The results under interleaving and
averaging collusion are shown in Fig. 4.2(e) and (f), respectively. Under interleav-
ing collusion, the proposed GRACE fingerprinting still has up to 0.2 improvement
on Pd over the conventional ECC fingerprinting. The group ECC fingerprinting by
appending performs worse than the conventional ECC fingerprinting with about
0.15 less on Pd. Under averaging collusion, the proposed GRACE fingerprinting
has comparable performance with the conventional ECC fingerprinting.
The above results can be explained as follows. When collusion happens within
a small number of groups, the group information is well preserved so that the
group detection for both GRACE fingerprinting and the group ECC fingerprinting
by appending has high accuracy. As the user subcodes within a small number of
groups can be well distinguished due to higher minimum distance than that of
the whole codebook, the colluder detection is more accurate than that of the non-
group case. When colluders come from multiple groups or even distinct groups
and apply interleaving collusion, the energy of the group subcode for GRACE
fingerprinting is reduced after collusion but does not completely diminish because
of the spreading of group information over the entire host signal. Therefore we
still have some improvement in detection, although it is not as much as the first
case.
For group ECC fingerprinting by appending, when the number of groups gets
larger, especially larger than Lg, it is likely that only part of the colluders con-
tribute the group subcode after segment-by-segment interleaving collusion. The
detector loses the information of some guilty groups, which leads to no perfor-
mance improvement over the ECC based fingerprinting. In contrast, the group
information from all colluders can be retained for the two group-based schemes
70
when colluders perform averaging operations, leading to the similar performance
by the two schemes. When multiple groups participate the collusion as in the
scenarios 2) and 3), the energy of the group information is reduced by averag-
ing. As such, the group detection has low accuracy, resulting in the diminishing
performance gain over ECC based fingerprinting.
The comparison between the GRACE fingerprinting and the group ECC fin-
gerprinting by appending demonstrates the performance improvement that can be
achieved by the joint consideration of coding and embedding. Without the joint
consideration, the group ECC fingerprinting by appending is equivalent to the
code-level grouping. Separating group information and user information makes it
vulnerable to multiple groups’ interleaving collusion. In contrast, the proposed
GRACE fingerprinting leverages the embedding layer to spread the group infor-
mation over multiple segments. This helps retain the group information after
collusion attacks, and thus helps identify the true colluders. In addition to WNR
= 0dB presented in Fig. 4.2, we also examined the cases of low WNRs, and the
comparative results are similar to high WNR case. Overall, the joint coding and
embedding as well as the grouping in the proposed GRACE system have brought
consistent performance improvement over the existing ECC based fingerprinting
under various scenarios.
4.1.4 Discussions
Security of the Group Information
From the results of the proposed scheme, we can see that the group information
helps narrow down the suspicious users in the colluder detection. However, if
the group information is not embedded properly, the attackers may figure out the
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positions of group subcode, and try to frame innocent groups and mislead the
detection. Therefore, the embedded group information should have sufficiently
high security. In the following, we shall examine the security of the group infor-
mation for GRACE fingerprinting and compare it with that of the group ECC
fingerprinting by appending.
For the group ECC fingerprinting by appending, all the users inside one group
have the same group subcode with length Lg, thus they have Lg segments in
common. On the other hand, for users coming from different groups, their matches
in the user subcodes are at most L − D, which is usually much smaller than Lg.
When several users compare their copies, they can examine the number of the
matched segments and figure out whether they belong to one group or not. They
may also identify the positions of the group subcode. With the position information
of the group subcode, one colluder may contribute his/her share only to the group
subcode positions and other colluders from a different group only contribute to
user subcode positions. We call this group-framing attack. Under this attack, after
the group detection, the colluder detection will be limited to the group where only
one colluder comes from. Since this colluder did not contribute the user subcode,
he/she is less likely to be declared as the colluder. Hence the probability of accusing
an innocent user as a colluder will be high.
For GRACE fingerprinting, each group has different group subcode from the
others. Within one group, users have different user subcodes. As a result of
the superposition of these two subcodes, the fingerprint sequence for each user
is different from any other user, and the colluders cannot separately identify the
group information by comparing their copies. We further note that no matter
which segment the colluder contributes, he/she always contributes both the group
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information and the user information. The group-framing attack mentioned above
cannot succeed here. Thus, the joint coding and embedding of GRACE provides
both an effective and a secure way to incorporate the group information.
Computational Complexity of GRACE Fingerprinting
Compared with the ECC based fingerprinting, the extra detection computation of
the GRACE fingerprinting comes from the detection of guilty groups, which needs
O(gN) computations for a total of g groups. Incorporating the computational
complexity of the ECC based fingerprinting derived in Section 2.4.1, the overall
computational complexity for the GRACE fingerprinting is O(qN) + O(gN). The
group number g is usually much smaller than the total number of users, and in
our example, g equals q. Therefore, the overall computational complexity remains
at O(qN), the same order as the ECC based fingerprinting.
It is worth mentioning that since in most cases the colluder detection is applied
within a small amount of groups, the suspicious user set to be examined will be
much smaller than that in non-grouped ECC based fingerprinting. This further
speeds up the colluder detection process.
Multi-level GRACE Fingerprinting
The idea of the proposed GRACE fingerprinting is to use the group information
to quickly narrow down the suspicious colluders to a small group of users. Within
each group, the minimum distance between the users’ codewords is larger than
that of the whole user set so that the users’ codewords are more separated and
easier to detect. Following this idea, we can extend our GRACE fingerprinting to
a general multi-level GRACE fingerprinting to capture more complicated collusion
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patterns.
For example, we partition a codebook with minimum distance D0 into groups.
Inside each group the minimum distance D1 is larger than D0. Then we repeat
this partition for each group until the minimum distance equals the code length L
or the structure of the group can capture the collusion pattern. When combining
the group information with the user information, we can adopt a similar strategy
used in the tree-based scheme in [70] to assign each level an orthogonal sequence
and embed them by proper scaling. At the detector side, the group information
at each level is used to narrow down the suspicious colluders to a smaller group,
and the colluder can be detected inside the extracted groups as before.
4.2 Combining GRACE with Permuted Subseg-
ment Embedding
Earlier in Chapter 3, we have proposed a new permuted subsegment embedding
technique for ECC based fingerprinting, which improves the collusion resistance
while retaining the efficiency in detection and distribution. We can combine the
permuted subsegment embedding and the GRACE fingerprinting to arrive at a
complete design of coded fingerprinting system as shown in Fig. 4.3. We envision
that the combined design can provide further improvement on collusion resistance,
and we will verify it through experiments.
In the combined design, the fingerprint sequence of group subcode is superposed
with that of the user subcode as before. We then employ the permuted subsegment
embedding to embed the superposed fingerprint sequence to the host signal. A
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Figure 4.3: Proposed framework of coded multimedia fingerprinting combining
GRACE with permuted subsegment embedding.
namely, the extraction of the group information followed by the soft detection of
the colluder using Eqn.(2.6) within the extracted groups. We demonstrate the
performance of the combined fingerprinting system through simulations on the
same system as we have examined in Section 4.1.
As we have expected, the combination of the proposed two approaches achieves
better results than each individual approach. In the cases with inaccurate group-
ing information (Fig. 4.4(c)-(f)), the permuted subsegment embedding further im-
proves the detection probability Pd of the fingerprinting system by 0.4-0.5 under
interleaving collusion at high WNR. The combined design can resist up to 25
users’ collusion with high probability of detection, which is more than three times
as many as that of the conventional ECC fingerprinting. When the grouping is
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(e) Distinct-Group Interleaving Collusion (f) Distinct-Group Averaging Collusion
Figure 4.4: Performance of the proposed GRACE fingerprinting with permuted
subsegment embedding technique: Probability of detection Pd vs. the colluder
number c and WNR.
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Pd to nearly 1 for a wide range of WNR and c.
In order to further demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed joint-coding-
and-embedding techniques, we apply the combination of the two newly proposed
approaches to natural images and compare its collusion resistance performance
with that of the conventional ECC fingerprinting. We use the transform-domain
spread spectrum scheme for fingerprint embedding, where the original image is
divided into 8 × 8 blocks and the fingerprint signal is added into the block DCT
coefficients after perceptual weighting. The fingerprint basis is generated according
to i.i.d. Gaussian distribution N(0, 1). In this experiment, we perform non-blind
detection where the original host signal is available and subtracted from a test
signal.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.5: (a) Original images; (b) Fingerprinted images; (c) Corresponding dif-
ference images (amplified by a factor of 10).
We select 512 × 512 Lena and Baboon as original images to demonstrate the
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Figure 4.6: Experimental results on real images of (a) Lena and (b) Baboon under
interleaving collusion.
performance of the proposed fingerprinting system on images with different na-
tures. We apply two schemes on both images and examine their performance
under collusion attacks: one is the conventional, non-grouped ECC based finger-
printing scheme, and the other is our proposed GRACE fingerprinting scheme with
permuted subsegment embedding. We employ the same coding setup as in Section
2.4.3 for these two images, i.e. Reed-Solomon code of length 30, dimension 2 and
minimum distance 29. The effective segment size is 2189 for Lena and 4740 for
Baboon. The fingerprinted images have an average PSNR of 41.6dB for Lena and
33.2dB for Baboon. Fig. 4.5 shows the original and fingerprinted images along
with the corresponding pixel-wise difference between them.
We examine the scenario of interleaving collusion by randomly distributed col-
luders across all groups with WNR = 0dB. The results of 100 iterations on the two
images are shown in Fig. 4.6, where the number of colluders the system can re-
sist is increased from 6 for conventional ECC fingerprinting to 25 for the proposed
combined scheme with detection probability as high as 0.98. We also examined the
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averaging collusion scenario, and the improvements for both cases are consistent
with earlier results on synthetic signals.
4.3 Adaptive Detection for Group-based Finger-
printing
Results in both our GRACE fingerprinting and the prior work by Wang et al. [70]
have shown that the grouping strategy increases the collusion resistance of both
non-coded and coded fingerprinting schemes when the grouping reflects the collu-
sion pattern. However, when the grouping does not match the collusion pattern
well, the group information in the colluded signal would be significantly reduced
and group detection may become unreliable, which would lead to a lower detection
accuracy than the non-grouped schemes. In this section, we explore how to design
and adapt the system to combat a wide range of collusion patterns, especially when
the actual collusion pattern is considerably different from the grouping patterns
in the system design [38]. For easy analysis, we choose to examine the adaptive
detection on non-coded group fingerprinting by Wang et al. [70] and the results on
GRACE fingerprinting will be also reported.
4.3.1 Non-Coded Group-based Fingerprinting
The group-based fingerprint construction in [70] takes advantage of the prior knowl-
edge on the collusion pattern by putting users who are likely to collude into the
same group and introducing correlation among their fingerprints. The constructed
fingerprint consists of user information and group information. The fingerprint
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sequence for user j who belongs to group i is constructed as
sij =
√
1− ρeij +√ρai, (4.3)
where ρ is used to adjust the correlation among the users’ fingerprints inside one
group as well as the ratio of the fingerprint energy assigned to group information;
eij’s are the spreading sequences for individual user information and they are
mutually orthogonal to each other; ai’s are the spreading sequences for group
information and they are orthogonal to each other and also to the user spreading
sequences eij’s.
The collusion attack considered in this section is K-user averaging collusion
plus additive noise. A number of other collusions based on order statistics, such
as minimum collusion attack, have been shown to be well approximated by such a















sij + x + d, (4.4)
where x is the host signal and L is the total number of groups. Sci ⊆ {1, ...,M} is a
subset with size |Sci| = ki and contains the members of group i who participate in
the collusion attack. M is the number of users inside each group. The additional
distortion is modelled as an i.i.d. additive Gaussian noise d with zero-mean and
variance σ2d.
The detection scheme consists of two stages [70]. The group information is first
used to detect the guilty groups and then the colluder detection is conducted within
the guilty groups. A correlation based method is employed for group detection [70],
that is,
TG(i) =
(z− x)T (si1 + si2 + ... + siM)√‖s‖2[M + (M2 −M)ρ] , (4.5)
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whose probability density function (pdf) is
p(TG(i)|K, ki, σ2d) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩










where ‖s‖ is the strength of the fingerprint and it is the same for each user due to
the equal-energy fingerprint construction. The i-th group is declared as guilty if
TG(i) > hG, where hG is the threshold for group detection.




j=1{Tei(j) ≥ h}, (4.7)




1− ρ(z− x)Teij√‖s‖2 .
The group threshold hG and the user threshold h are chosen such that the false
alarm on group detection is bounded by α1 and the probability for an innocent
user to be declared as colluder is bounded by α2:
α1  Pr(TG(i) ≥ hG|ki = 0) = Q(hG
σd
); (4.8)




Thus, h = Q−1(α2)σd
√
1− ρ and hG = Q−1(α1)σd, where the Q-function is de-





2π exp(−x2/2)dx. The overall probability of catching one
















where l is the number of guilty groups, pi is the probability of a false alarm event
in which at least one innocent user from group i is declared as colluder, and qi
is the probability of a correct detection event in which at least one true colluder
from group i is declared as guilty. Both pi and qi contain multiple terms with the
form of a Q-function, and they are functions of the three parameters ρ, α1 and α2,
which should be chosen in such a way that
{α1, α2, ρ} = arg max
α1,α2,ρ
Pd(α1, α2, ρ) (4.11)
subject to Pfp(α1, α2, ρ) ≤ ε.
4.3.2 Performance Evaluation of Group-based Fingerprint-
ing
Due to multiple terms of Q-function in Eqn. (4.10), closed-form relations between
systems performance Pd and system parameters ρ and α1 on an arbitrary collu-
sion pattern cannot be found. Commonly used analytical bounds are usually not
very tight for our performance evaluation purpose. We use the system in [70] as
an example and examine the optimization problem of (4.11) through numerical
evaluation to approximate the optimal solution to the parameter settings.
In the example system, we choose fingerprint sequence with length 104 and
examine the detection performance at Watermark-to-Noise-Ratio (WNR) of 0dB.
There are totally L = 100 groups and M = 60 users in each group; a total of
K = 64 users participate in averaging collusion. These values are chosen based on
the guidelines from the orthogonal fingerprinting study in [71] in order to maintain
good collusion resistance of mutually orthogonal group-fingerprint on the group
detection level as well as the orthogonal user fingerprint within each group. We
consider the worst-case scenario in detecting at least one of the true colluders,
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where all the colluders are evenly distributed among l guilty groups, i.e. ki = K/l.
The colluder detection performance at Pfa = 0.1 under two different collusion
patterns of l = 4 and l = 16, respectively, is shown in Fig. 4.7. We can see that the
values of ρ and α1 significantly affect the detection probability Pd, and the values of
these two parameters that achieve the optimal Pd under different collusion patterns

































Figure 4.7: Pd versus ρ and α1 under averaging collusion attack from (a) 4 groups
and (b) 16 groups.
The effect of ρ From the fingerprint construction of Eqn. (4.3) and group de-
tection analysis in Eqn. (4.6), we can see that the larger the ρ is, the higher the
correlation is and the better the group detection is. But large ρ also reduces the
energy that can be allocated to represent individual user and therefore may reduce
the detection accuracy.
We take the same system as that of Fig. 4.7 and numerically examine the effect
of different ρ’s on the collusion resistance. Three scenarios with l = 4, 8, 16 are
studied, and the results of Pd at Pfa = 0.1 are shown in Fig. 4.8, along with
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the results of orthogonal fingerprinting [71]. From Fig. 4.8, we can see that the
difference of Pd’s under different ρ values can be up to 70%, and there is no ρ value
that reaches the best performance under all the collusion patterns. We also note
that ρ must be determined during the design of the system without the knowledge
of the actual collusion patterns. Thus, ρ value should be chosen to achieve a good
performance trade-off under a broad range of anticipated collusion patterns. For
the experiment settings in Fig. 4.8, relatively small ρ around 0.1, instead of a
higher setting of 0.4 as in [70], leads to a better trade-off among various collusion
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l = 4 Group FP
l = 8 Group FP
l = 16 Group FP
Orthogonal FP
Figure 4.8: Pd vs. ρ under averaging-collusion attack.
The intuition of choosing relatively small ρ is as follows. When the grouping
strategy captures the collusion pattern, many colluders come from the same group
i, and thus they have the same group information
√
ρai in their fingerprints. Under
averaging collusion, the energy of this group information will not be reduced much,
as can be seen from the mean value of detection statistic TG(i) for guilty group







, although the total number of colluders
K can be quite large, ki, the number of colluders inside group i, is also large. As
a result, even with a small ρ, the mean value of TG(i) would be reasonably high
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to distinguish the guilty groups from innocent groups, leading to a high detection
probability. When the grouping strategy does not reflect the collusion pattern,
ki would be quite small for all the groups. Thus TG(i) for guilty groups would
have a small mean value, leading to a less reliable group detection. To achieve a
high colluder detection accuracy, we would then rely more on the user information
part of the fingerprint in the second step detection. Relatively small ρ value keeps
the energy of user information strong to distinguish each individual user and help
achieve a high probability of detection. Therefore, relatively small ρ provides a
good performance trade-off under a wide range of collusion patterns.










































Figure 4.9: Group detection statistics for colluders from (a) 2 groups, and (b) 4
groups.
The Effect of α1 and hG In the two-step detection strategy, the false alarm
of group detection α1 and group detection threshold hG are related through the
false alarm probability of group detection in Eqn. (4.8), and they determine the
accuracy of group detection. If this step is accurate enough, as illustrated by






































l = 4 Group FP
l = 8 Group FP
l = 16 Group FP
ORTH FP
Figure 4.10: Pd vs. α1 under averaging-collusion attack.
users are successfully filtered out in the first step, so the second step of locating
individual colluders only needs to focus on a small set of users and can achieve
a high detection accuracy. However, if the group detection is not accurate, the
second step of detecting colluders cannot take advantage of the grouping strategy
and the system performance may become worse than the non-grouping case. There
are two cases of inaccurate group detection. One is when the threshold is too low
that many innocent groups are passed onto the second step detection, as shown
in Fig. 4.9(a) with “threshold 2”. The increase in the number of innocent users
incurs higher probability of false alarm during the colluder detection, leading to a
low overall detection accuracy. The other case is when the threshold is so high that
many groups, including true guilty groups, fail to pass the group detection. This
is shown in Fig. 4.9(b) for “threshold 1”. With few true colluders being inside the
suspicious user set, it is difficult for the second step detection to correctly identify
the colluder. Therefore, α1 should be chosen carefully in the detection.
We examine different α1 values for the above system settings with ρ = 0.1
according to the above discussions, and show the results of Pd for a fixed Pfa = 0.1
in Fig. 4.10. We see that when colluders come from only 4 groups, a low value
86
of α1 = 10
−6 provides the highest detection probability Pd, and a wide range
of α1 values can lead to near optimal Pd. When colluders spread to more and
more groups, the value of α1 achieving the highest Pd increases to 3 × 10−3 for
8-group collusion and to 3 × 10−2 for 16-group collusion. Pd for low α1 value at
around 10−6 significantly drops and becomes even lower than that of orthogonal
fingerprinting. Collectively considering various collusion patterns, we can see that
for this particular system that we have examined, a less stringent setting for α1,
such as 10−2, has a better trade-off in the detection performance. This is because
when most colluders come from only a few groups as shown in Fig. 4.9(a), with
high probability the group detection statistics for guilty groups have large values
and are much higher than that of innocent groups. In this case, employing a
moderate threshold rather than a low one can help filter out more innocent groups
and pass most of the guilty groups to the second detection step, leading to a high
overall detection probability as shown in Fig. 4.10 for l = 4, 8. When colluders
come from multiple groups, the group detection statistics of guilty groups are
reduced and not very distinguishable from those of innocent groups as shown in
Fig. 4.9(b). Compared with a high threshold, a moderate threshold enables the
detector to include more guilty groups into the second step detection to achieve a
better performance as shown in Fig. 4.10 with l = 16.
An important finding suggested by the above analysis is that a variable thresh-
old in group detection is necessary to deal with different collusion patterns. In fact,
the detector has the freedom to adjust α1 according to its findings and to adapt
the threshold value for group detection according to the detection statistics. In the
next section, we present an adaptive group detector and examine its performance.
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4.3.3 Adaptive Detection
Studies in Section 4.3.2 suggest that an ideal group detector should be able to
adjust the threshold for various collusion patterns. To achieve this, the detector
first needs to collect information to infer the underlying collusion pattern. From
the group detection statistics, we can see that when colluders come from a small
number of groups as system designers expect, the detection statistics are high for
guilty groups and low for innocent groups. This is because the shared group infor-
mation in colluders’ fingerprints is preserved after collusion and has relatively high
energy. On the other hand, when collusion pattern does not match the grouping,
the detection statistics for guilty groups are low and not very distinguishable from
innocent groups. Another scenario is that a non-trivial part of the colluders come
from one group i, and the other colluders scatter over several groups. The detec-
tion statistic for group i will be high with high probability, although the detection
statistics for others groups are low.
As the detection statistics on the group information reflect the collusion pat-
tern, we examine how to exploit the detection statistics to facilitate the group
detection. A good and easy-to-obtain indicator for collusion patterns is the maxi-
mal group detection statistic TGmax, which can be used by the adaptive detector as
a baseline to set threshold. For example, the threshold hG can be made to be pro-
portional to TGmax, i.e. hG = γTGmax with 0 < γ < 1, so that group i is declared
guilty if TG(i) > γTGmax. We set γ at 0.5 in our experiments. The probability of
group i being caught, PGd(i), can be obtained by






Pr(TG(r) < t/γ)fTG(i)(t)dt, (4.12)
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where TG(i) follows a Gaussian distribution according to Eqn. (4.6). We can then
analyze the colluder detection probability Pd and false alarm probability Pfp by
following similar strategies as in [70]. By choosing the threshold in this way, at
least one group will always be identified as possibly containing traitors and passed
onto the second stage in detection to pinpoint the colluders, whereas in the non-
adaptive detection it is possible that all groups are vindicated in the first stage
and never make it to the second stage of detection even when there are traitors.
We examine the performance of the proposed adaptive group detection and
choose the same system as studied in the previous sections, i.e. L = 100,M = 60,
and K = 64. We consider three different collusion scenarios of l = 24, 8, 2, and
compare the results with the corresponding non-adaptive detection cases. For com-
parison, we choose α1 = 10
−2 for the non-adaptive scheme, as this setting provides
the best performance for a non-adaptive detector according to the studies in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. The results in Fig. 4.11(a) and (b) show that when all the colluders
come from only a few groups so that the group structure well reflects the collusion
pattern, the adaptive detection can perform better than the non-adaptive scheme;
and both schemes outperform the orthogonal fingerprinting that does not exploit
the group structure. The improvement of adaptive detection can be up to 10% in
Pd for the same Pfp over non-adaptive scheme, and up to 70% over orthogonal fin-
gerprinting. When the colluders scatter over tens of groups and thus the collusion
pattern does not match the group structure, non-adaptive detection scheme does
not have advantage over orthogonal fingerprinting, as indicated in Fig. 4.11(c). In
contrast, our proposed adaptive detection is able to adjust the threshold accord-
ingly, and thus outperforms the non-adaptive detection by 5% ∼ 10% improvement




























































































































ADFP γ = 0.5
ORTH
(c) (d)
Figure 4.11: ROC curve comparisons for the adaptive and non-adaptive group-
based fingerprinting. Averaging collusion attack from: (a) 2 groups, (b) 8 groups
and (c) 24 groups. (d) Probability of detection vs. different collusion patterns for
adaptive detection with γ = 0.5 and non-adaptive detection with α1 of 10
−6 to
10−1 under Pfa = 0.01.
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we examine different collusion patterns and show the results of detection for both
adaptive and non-adaptive schemes in Fig. 4.11(d). In this figure, we fix the prob-
ability of false alarm at 0.01 and examined various thresholds for non-adaptive
scheme. The γ for the adaptive scheme is set at 0.5. We can see that the pro-
posed adaptive detection consistently has better or comparable performance to
non-adaptive scheme under a variety of collusion scenarios, and the performance
curve of the proposed adaptive detection is the upper envelope of those achievable
by non-adaptive detection at various settings.
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Adaptive γ = 0.5
(a) (b)
Figure 4.12: Performance comparison of adaptive detection and non-adaptive de-
tection on Group-based ECC fingerprinting under averaging collusion attack from:
(a) 2 groups, (b) distinct groups.
We have also applied the adaptive detection to coded group fingerprinting sys-
tem proposed in Section 4.1 and compare it with non-adaptive detection results.
Fig. 4.12 shows the detection results of the same system settings examined in Sec-
tion 4.1, which is constructed based on Reed-Solomon code with alphabet size
of 32 and dimension 2. The code is divided into 32 groups and each group con-
tains 32 codewords. We vary the threshold for group detection in a wide range
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of 1.7∼3.9, while the adaptive detection threshold parameter γ is set at 0.5. In
order to demonstrate the performance difference clearly, we choose Watermark-
to-Noise-Ratio (WNR) as -10dB during the examination. Fig. 4.12(a) shows the
detection under the collusion from two groups and Fig. 4.12(b) shows the results
under collusion from distinct groups, i.e. any pair of colluders come from different
groups. It can be seen that a fixed group detection threshold cannot generate high
detection probability for various collusion patterns. A threshold of 3.9 gives sat-
isfactory detection accuracy under 2-group collusion, but the performance drops
sharply when the colluders come from distinct groups. In contrast, the proposed
adaptive detection consistently leads to higher performance than the fixed thresh-
olding scheme under various colluder numbers and collusion patterns. Overall, the
adaptive detection provides performance improvement over non-adaptive detection
scheme under various scenarios.
4.4 Chapter Summary
Because of cultural and other social reasons, users often form a collusion group
in a foreseeable pattern. Taking advantage of this observation and based on our
previous study, we have proposed a group-based joint coding and embedding fin-
gerprinting system. In this system, the fingerprint for each user is compact and
consists of user sub-codeword and group sub-codeword, which are embedded over-
lappingly in host signal via spread spectrum technique. The detection is done
in two levels, which identifies guilty groups through correlation and then narrows
down to specific colluders through minimum distance decoding inside the extracted
guilty groups. Simulation results show that the proposed fingerprinting system
can provide substantial improvement over existing ECC based fingerprinting. The
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group information helps to limit the suspicious users to a smaller set, and leads to
a higher probability of detection.
In addition, we have proposed an adaptive detection approach for group-based
fingerprinting. Through analyzing the existing group-based fingerprinting, we have
found that the overall detection accuracy is sensitive to the group detection thresh-
old, and the threshold achieving good performance is closely related to the collusion
pattern. Based on this observation, we propose a new adaptive detection method
that automatically adjusts the group detection threshold according to the detection
statistics for group information to adapt to different collusion patterns. Results
show that the proposed adaptive detection is superior to the non-adaptive detec-
tion under a variety of collusion scenarios, and can provide up to 10% improvement




Fingerprinting for Large User
Group
With the advances of broadband communication and compression technologies, an
increasing amount of video will be shared among large groups of users through the
Internet and other broadband channels. For example, in applications such as cable
TV, the user number can be as high as 10∼100 million. The potential adversary
group may involve hundreds of colluders. However, most of the existing finger-
printing schemes consider an experimental settings with user number on the order
of a few thousand and a small collusion group around 10 colluders and cannot
cannot reach such large user size and high collusion resistance requirements. For
example, to hold 10 million users, the Boneh-Shaw scheme [9] gives a code on the
order of 107 bits that needs 22-hour video for embedding, and it can only resist 10
users’ collusion. On the other hand, the orthogonal fingerprinting can be scaled
up to hold 10 million users with collusion resistance of 100, but the detection com-
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putational complexity increases linearly with the number of users and it becomes
prohibitively high for large scale system. In literature of traitor tracing through
cryptographic keys [39–41], the large scale of user group has been constantly con-
sidered during the scheme design. The basic idea of these works is to use codes to
establish key set for each user to access the content, which shares similarity with
the coded fingerprinting such as [22,52]. When directly extended to fingerprinting
application by modulating each code symbol with spreading sequence and adding
the sequence to the host signal, these schemes would have rather limited collusion
resistance as the case in [22,52] because the embedding layer is not well utilized.
Table 5.1 summarizes the performance of existing fingerprinting schemes and
those extended from traitor tracing schemes for a user group of 10 million with
probability of miss detection on the order of 10−3. From this table, we can see
that to hold such a large user group, Boneh-Shaw scheme requires an extremely
long host signal and has very low collusion resistance. For all other schemes, we fix
the host signal length and compare their collusion resistance and detection com-
putational complexity. We observe a low collusion resistance for traditional ECC
based fingerprinting and a high detection complexity for orthogonal fingerprinting
and the anti-collusion code (ACC) fingerprinting.
Different from other fingerprinting schemes, our proposed joint coding and em-
bedding strategies built on top of the ECC fingerprinting offer much improved
collusion resistance while retaining the efficiency in construction, detection and
distribution of the fingerprinted signal. Such advantages of the improved ECC
fingerprinting makes it attractive for video applications, especially under the chal-
lenging settings of millions of users and hundreds of colluders. The large scale
system, however, introduces several issues that have not been addressed in the
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Table 5.1: Performance Comparison of Existing Fingerprinting Schemes with User
Number Nu = 10 Million
Fingerprinting Schemes Col. Resis. Required Sig. Len. (N) Det. Complexity
Boneh-Shaw FP [9,78] 10 22-hour video O(N + Nu)
ECC FP [22,39,52] <10 Several minutes video O( k
√
Nu(N + Nu))
ACC FP [64] ∼ 100 Several minutes video O(√NuN + Nu)
Orthogonal FP [71] ∼ 100 Several minutes video O(NuN)
Joint Coding-Emebedding ∼ 100 Several minutes video O( k√Nu(N + Nu))
existing literature. First, in large scale system where millions fingerprinted copies
need to be generated and distributed, the efficient fingerprint construction with
low computational complexity becomes an important issue. Meanwhile, the high
collusion resistance requirement places a constraint on the code construction and
embedding. How to construct and embed the code to meet efficient construction
and high collusion resistance is a problem. Second, the detection of the existing
improved ECC based fingerprinting employs maximal correlation based detector.
Ideally, this detector can provide good performance for the large scale system.
However, the large number of users will result in a high computational complexity,
which becomes an issue in real-world applications. Therefore, we need to pursue a
more efficient detection to reduce the computational complexity and to retain the
good detection performance.
In this chapter, we explore the application of the joint coding-embedding frame-
work to video fingerprinting for such a large scale system and address a few major
design and algorithmic issues. In particular, we first address the issue of code struc-
ture to achieve higher collusion resistance and maintain the efficient construction
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and distribution. We then propose an efficient detection algorithm for joint coding
and embedding fingerprinting which significantly speeds up the detection while
maintaining a good detection performance. To our best knowledge, this is the first
work of applying embedded fingerprinting on multimedia signal with such chal-
lenging user capacity and collusion resistance requirements as tens of millions of
users and hundreds of colluders [35,37].
5.1 Large-Scale Video Fingerprinting
5.1.1 Analysis of Collusion Resistance
In a collusion-resistant fingerprinting system, we usually measure the collusion
resistance terms of the probability of catching one of the true colluders. Recall from
Section 2.4.3, under averaging collusion and additional additive white Gaussian
noise, the vector of detection statistics TN ’s defined in Eqn. (2.6) follows an Nu-
dimensional Gaussian distribution:
T = [TN(1), ..., TN (Nu)]
T ∼ N([m1,m2]T , σ2dΣ) (5.1)











1K , m2 = ‖s‖ρ1n−K .
Here 1k is an all one vector with dimension k-by-1; ρ is the pair-wise correlation
between fingerprint sequences; Σ is an Nu-by-Nu covariance matrix whose diagonal
elements are 1’s and off-diagonal elements are ρ’s; σ2d is the variance of the additive
noise; m1 is the mean vector for colluders; and m2 is the mean vector for innocent
users. Given the same colluder number K and fingerprint strength ‖s‖, the mean
correlation values with colluders and with innocents are separated more widely
for a smaller correlation ρ between each pair of sequences. This suggests that in
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absence of any prior knowledge on collusion patterns, a smaller ρ leads to a higher
colluder detection probability Pd.
To facilitate the study, we derive the expression for the detection probability Pd






















1− ρ )φ(y)φ(z)dydzdt, (5.2)
where Φ(·) and φ(·) denote the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of standard Gaussian distribution
N(0, 1), respectively. The detailed derivation is presented in Section 5.5.1. We
numerically examine the Pd under different ρ values for a system with Nu = 1024
and N = 30, 000 under WNR= −10dB, and show the results in Fig. 5.1. The
results are consistent with the conjecture that a small ρ value leads to a higher
detection accuracy and thus is preferred in the system design. According to Section
2.4.3, the correlation ρ between fingerprint sequences constructed from ECC code








We can choose k and L to make ρ close to 0 for good collusion resistance.
With this theoretical model, we can numerically examine the system’s perfor-
mance to determine whether the coded fingerprinting can meet the challenging
requirements on user number and collusion resistance. In the examination, we set
the total number of users Nu = 10
8, embeddable host signal length N = 2 × 107,
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Figure 5.1: Pd of ECC fingerprinting with different intra-fingerprint correlation ρ.
which corresponds to a video signal less than 10 minutes, and correlation ρ = 0.03.
The performance of the coded fingerprinting under this setting is shown in Fig. 5.2,
where we consider different values of colluder number K with WNR (Watermark-
to-Noise Ratio) ranging from −20dB to 0dB. The settings of WNR include the
scenarios from severe distortion to mild distortion. We can see that even under
severe distortion, WNR = −20dB, the system has the potential to protect a video
signal as short as 10 minutes and resist more than 100 users’ collusion out of
100 million users. This promising result inspires us to explore the application of
ECC fingerprinting onto video signals with large user group and address several
important issues in this chapter.
5.1.2 Fingerprint Construction for Reaching Large Scale
The high data volume in a video stream provides seemingly abundant spaces for
data embedding and offers high degrees of freedom in choosing how to fingerprint.
We need to determine how to apply ECC fingerprinting onto video signals to
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Figure 5.2: Analytical results of ECC based fingerprinting for Nu = 108, N = 2 × 107
and ρ = 0.03.
achieve the large user scale. One way is to construct the first round of ECC-based
fingerprint sequences as basis sequences and employ another layer of fingerprint
code to reach the user capacity as shown in Fig. 5.3(a). The fingerprint sequences
of the inner layer serves as the alphabet for the outer code. For example, we build
an ECC based fingerprinting with Reed-Solomon code (L, k,D)q = (6, 2, 5)8 and
obtain 64 fingerprint sequences according to the ECC fingerprint construction and
applying permuted subsegment embedding on these sequences; then using these
64 sequences as basis sequences, we apply an outer code of RS (62, 2, 61)64 on top
of the ECC fingerprinting, arriving at an overall system for a total of 642 users.
This scheme provides a more efficient fingerprint construction than the inner ECC
fingerprint alone since it requires fewer spreading sequences due to one more code
layer and also enables an efficient distribution to users. However, through the
performance evaluation of ECC fingerprinting in Chapter 2, we can see that in
multi-level fingerprinting schemes, the outer level code structure limits the collu-
sion resistance of the whole system, even though its inner level has high collusion
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resistance. In this case, the attackers may apply segment-wise interleaving attack,
i.e. one segment of the colluded signal (corresponding to one symbol in the outer
code) comes from one of the colluders, which is equivalent to attackers’ applying
interleaving attack on the code level. Thus, this kind of fingerprinting systems
mainly relies on the code level collusion resistance, which is usually very low (less
than 10) due to finite alphabet size of the code. To verify this, we build a two-layer
system with inner RS(6, 2, 5)8 along with permuted subsegment embedding and an
outer code RS(62, 2, 61)64. The simulation results under interleaving collusion in
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Directly Apply ECCFP WNR = 0dB
Directly Apply ECCFP WNR = −10dB 
Using ECCFP as building−blcok WNR = 0dB
Using ECCFP as building−blcok WNR = −10dB
Figure 5.3: Coding-embedding structures and performance comparison. (a) Build-
ing an outer code on ECC fingerprinting to reach user capacity; (b) Using finger-
print code to reach user capacity and then applying permuted subsegment embed-
ding; (c) Collusion resistance under interleaving collusion for both schemes in (a)
and (b).
Another way is to directly apply ECC fingerprinting, that is, to first build a fin-
gerprint code to reach the user capacity and then apply the permuted subsegment
embedding to embed the fingerprint into the video signal, as shown in Fig. 5.3(b).
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Continuing with the settings in the above example, this second approach would
first construct a concatenated code using RS(6, 2, 5)8 and RS(62, 2, 61)64, followed
by applying permuted subsegment embedding. The results are also shown in
Fig. 5.3(c), where we can see a much better collusion resistance compared with
the previous method. The resistance against interleaving collusion is increased
from 10 colluders to more than 50 colluders under WNR of 0dB and to 40 col-
luders under WNR = −10dB. The improvement is due to the step of random
permutation before the embedding. The random permutation prevents the attack-
ers from knowing which subsegment corresponds to which symbol. As a result, the
attackers cannot identify the code level and arbitrarily manipulate each symbol
to mount the symbol-wise interleaving attack on either inner code or outer code.
Leveraging the embedding layer, the fingerprinting system is able to resist much
more colluders than the code level alone. Therefore, designing fingerprint code to
reach user capacity first and then applying permuted subsegment embedding to
instill randomness to enhance collusion resistance is a preferred way to construct
fingerprint signals for a large number of users.
5.1.3 Efficient Detection through Trimming
Recall from Section 2.4.1 that the computational complexity of the detection for
ECC-based fingerprinting is the sum of two terms: qN for demodulation and NuL
for colluder identification. When the number of users scales up to millions, the sec-
ond term NuL becomes a non-trivial part of the total computational complexity. In




We propose to employ a trimming process based on the detection results on prede-
fined symbol positions, which we refer to as trimming positions. We first calculate
the correlation statistics T sij for the segments Ψ corresponding to trimming posi-
tions with every possible spreading sequence. That is:
T sij =
(zi − xi)Tuj
‖uj‖ , i ∈ Ψ; j = 1, 2, ..., q.
where zi and xi are the i
th segment of the test signal and original signal, respec-
tively, and uj is the spreading sequence for symbol j. Then, for each trimming
position i ∈ Ψ, we pick the symbols that have higher statistic than a threshold h
as candidate symbols:
Si = {j|T sij > h}, i ∈ Ψ. (5.4)
The codewords that match candidate symbols in Si for all the positions in Ψ are
put into a suspicious codeword set W :
W = {w|wi ∈ Si, i ∈ Ψ}.
Finally, we apply matched filter detection of Eqn. (2.6) within the suspicious set
W to identify the colluder.
The computational complexity of this scheme is determined by the number
of trimming positions. If k′ symbol positions are used for trimming, the resulting
computational complexity for colluder identification can be reduced from O(qkL) to
O(qk−k
′
L), and the reduction is qk
′
-fold. For example, in a system holding around
1000 users with q = 32 and k = 2, when we use all the information symbols for
trimming, we can obtain more than 1000 times reduction on the computational
complexity. The detection computational complexity can be more significantly
reduced for a large scale system with large q and k′.
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Choosing Trimming Positions
In order to find out the corresponding codeword given the symbol values at certain
positions, i.e. to find out W given {Si, i ∈ Ψ}, we generally need to solve the equa-
tion of xHT = 0 that contains L−k equations and L−k′ unknowns. Here, H is the
parity check matrix of the code, x is the codeword vector with known symbols at
position Ψ and unknowns at remaining positions, and k′ ≤ k. The number of solu-
tions for these equations is qk−k
′
corresponding to the qk−k
′
suspicious codewords
after the trimming. The computational complexity of solving such an equation
array is O((L − k)3 + qk−k′L), whose two terms correspond to Gaussian elimina-
tion process and the enumeration of all qk−k
′
codewords satisfying the equations,
respectively. To further reduce the complexity, we employ systematic construction
for Reed-Solomon code to build fingerprint code and use the information sym-
bols for trimming. In the systematic code construction, the first k symbols in the
codeword are the information symbols, the remaining are parity check symbols.
These information symbols provide the index of users and can be used to easily
identify the users/codewords. The position information of these symbols (or the
corresponding segments) is protected from adversaries by the random permutation
during the permuted subsegment embedding. To achieve higher detection accu-
racy, it is desirable to assign more energy on the trimming symbols. We accomplish
this by expanding the fingerprint sequence length by γ times for each information
symbol, so that the segment length becomes Ns = γN/(L + k(γ − 1)), where N
is the total sequence length and L is the codeword length. The segment size for
remaining symbols would be N/(L+k(γ−1)). The expansion can be implemented
by repeatedly embedding the sequence corresponding to the information symbols
by γ times.
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Figure 5.4: Correlation ρ vs. Expansion factor γ.
One of the effects of the expansion is the increase in correlation between fin-
gerprint sequences. Recall that a Reed-Solomon code with parameters (L, k) has
the minimum distance of D = L− k +1 or any two codewords share at most k− 1
symbols. For some pairs of codewords, the symbols in common lie at the infor-
mation symbol positions. Thus after the expansion, the number of shared symbol
becomes γ(k− 1). For codewords that have fewer than k− 1 information symbols
in common, the number of shared symbols after the expansion would be smaller
than γ(k − 1). Therefore, in the expanded code, the minimum distance becomes




L + k(γ − 1) . (5.5)
Fig. 5.4 shows the relationship between the correlation ρ′ and the expansion factor
γ. We can see that the correlation increases as γ becomes larger, and in turn the
overall detection accuracy may decrease according to the results in Eqn. (5.1). On
the other hand, high γ enhances the accuracy of trimming symbol detection and
thus may lead to a high overall probability of detection Pd. We examine the effect
of the expansion factor γ on Pd and show the results in Fig. 5.5 at WNR of 0dB
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and −10dB. In this figure, we set the host signal length as N = 30, 000 and the
total number of users Nu = 1024. The code is constructed by Reed-Solomon code
with L = 30, k = 2 and q = 32. Both information symbols are used for trimming.
From the results, we find that there is an optimal value of γ for a given k′ to
achieve the highest detection probability. For the particular experimental settings
in Fig. 5.5, γ = 3 achieves the best detection results. In the next section, we will
theoretically analyze Pd as a function of the system parameters, and optimal γ can
be derived based on the theoretical model. In Fig. 5.6, we examine Pd of trimming
detection and matched-filter detection with γ = 3 under WNR = −10dB and
−5dB. We can see that, compared with matched-filter detection, the accuracy
of trimming detection is only reduced by less than 6% for low WNRs and less
than 0.5% for moderate WNRs. In most fingerprinting applications, since the
host signal is usually available to the detector and its interference can be removed
from the test signal, we expect a WNR higher than -5dB and thus a comparable
performance by trimming detection to matched-filter detection. Meanwhile, the
trimming detection reduces the detection computational complexity by qk
′
, which
is around 1000 times in this experimental settings. As can be seen from the results,
the efficiency of trimming detection is at a negligible expense of lower performance
than matched-filter detection
Performance Analysis
We analyze the performance of the proposed trimming detection in terms of the
detection probability. For simplicity, we show the analysis for the case that only
one information symbol position is used for trimming and the symbol with highest
correlation statistic is chosen to trim the codebook. Thus after trimming, there
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Figure 5.5: Pd vs. expansion factor γ by trimming detector at WNR of (a) -10dB
and (b) -5dB.
remain qk−1 codewords in the codebook. We assume random collusion in our
analysis, i.e. all the users have equal probability to participate the collusion.
Without loss of generality, we select the first symbol position as the trimming
position and its corresponding frame size is Ns = γN/(L + k(γ − 1)). We call the
symbol in the alphabet as color and thus there are q colors for a q-ary codebook.
Note that for a linear code, such as Reed-Solomon code considered in this chapter,
at any given position, each color occurs the same number of times among all
the codewords. That is, each color occurs in qk−1 codewords among totally qk
codewords. When considering random collusion attack, the effect of forming a
K-colluder group on the first symbol position is to choose K symbols from qk






. Denote the colluders’ color pattern at the trimming
position as a vector c = [c1 c2 ... cn] and
∑n
i=1 ci = K, where n is the total number
of colors and ci is the number of symbols with color i. For example, a vector
c = [1 2 2] means that among the first symbol position of 5 colluders’ codewords,
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Figure 5.6: Performance comparison of trimming detection vs. matched filter
detection with expansion factor γ = 3 at WNR of (a) -10dB and (b) -5dB.
there are three different colors in total: one color appears once, one appears twice,
and another also appears twice. The exact color values do not affect the analysis
here, because of the symmetry of the code as well as the randomness of the collusion
and the mutual independence of the fingerprint sequences for different colors. For
example, for the color pattern [1 2 2] and color alphabet {A, ..., F}, the instance of
{A A B D D} and {A B B F F} would result in the same detection probability.









k−1)Pr(Ti = max(T1, .., Tq)).
Here, “subcode i” refers to the set of codewords having color i at the trimming
position; Pd(ci, q
k−1) is calculated according to Eqn. (5.2) with K replaced by ci
and n replaced by qk−1; and Eqn. (5.5) is used for calculating ρ′. The probability
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of subcode i being picked at the trimming position is calculated by
Pr(Ti = max(T1, .., Tq)) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Πj =iPr(Tj < t)fi(t)dt,
Tj ∼ N( cj
K
‖u‖, σ2d) j = 1, ..., q (5.6)
where Tj is the detection statistic for symbol j and fi(t) is the p.d.f. of Ti. Note that
Tj’s are independent Gaussian variables with equal variance, due to the presence of
white Gaussian noise and the orthogonality of the sequences representing different
symbols. For those colors that are not contained in the colluders’ codewords, cj’s
are set to 0.




Pd|c × Pr(c). (5.7)
Here, CK is the set of all color patterns for K colluders, and it can be recursively













where C\IK denote the set of row vectors in CK excluding the rows containing element
in I. 1 represents an all “1” column vector with the same number of entries as
the row number of CK−1, and 2 represents an all “2” column vector with the same
number of entries as the row number of C\{1}K−2, and so on. In the above matrix, each
row vector contains q elements and represents one possible color pattern generated
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Here, a = [a1, a2, ..., am] is an auxiliary vector representing the histogram of a color
pattern c, m is the number of distinct values in vector c and ai is the number of
occurrence of ith value in vector c. The detailed derivations for CK and Pr(c) are
presented in Section 5.5.2.
According to the above analysis, we are able to derive the CK matrix for any
K value and get the α value for each c vector (each row of CK). By plugging these
quantities into Eqn. (5.7), we obtain the analytical expression of probability of
detection Pd for the trimming method. The optimal parameter γ
∗ can be chosen




The analysis for a more general trimming detection can be conducted in a
similar way. For example, we can set a threshold for the trimming detection
statistic T to select multiple symbols as shown in Eqn. (5.4). The only changes














k−1)Pr(Ti > h)Pr(Tj > h)
q∏
m=1,m=i,j





Pd(ci + cj, 2q











Pr(Tm < h), (5.10)
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where h is a threshold, and











Multiple-position trimming can be analyzed by iteratively applying the above anal-
ysis process.































Figure 5.7: Comparison of theoretical and experimental results of trimming detec-
tion: (a) -10dB and (b) -5dB.
We numerically examine the analysis result with the parameter settings of
Nu = 1024, q = 32, and k = 2. The trimming detection is performed only on
the first symbol position and the color with highest detection statistic is picked
for trimming. The results for two WNR values (−10dB and −5dB) are shown in
Fig. 5.7, along with the simulation results at the same parameter settings. We can
see that the analytical results match the experimental results well for most of the
K values. The small gap at some points comes from the numerical computation
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error on the combination terms in Pr(c) and the calculation of Pd|c, where a simpli-
fication of equal-correlation is assumed in the analysis while the actual fingerprints
have different correlation values according to the codebook construction.
5.2 Experimental Results
5.2.1 Experimental settings and results
In this section, we apply the proposed fingerprinting scheme on video signals and
examine the experimental performance. The test video signal is obtained from [3]
and has VGA size of 640-by-480. The total number of users that we target at
is on the order of ten million and colluder number is around 100. We choose a
Reed-Solomon code with q = 64, k = 4, and L = 63, which leads to the number
of users Nu = 1.6 × 107. The expansion parameter γ in the efficient detection
is set at 3, and the first 4 symbol positions are selected for trimming. Thus the
equivalent codeword length is 71 and the resulting pairwise maximum correlation
is ρ′ = 0.127 according to Eqn. (5.5).
During the fingerprint embedding, each frame is transformed into DCT domain.
Fingerprint sequences are embedded into these DCT coefficients through additive
embedding with perceptual scaling. The host video signal is chosen to have 852
frames with about 12 frames for each codeword symbol. For simplicity, we repeat-
edly embed the same fingerprint sequence into every group of frames consisting
of 6 consecutive frames [77]. The issue of intra-video collusion attack will be dis-
cussed in Section 5.3.2. Subsegment partition factor β is set as 24. Fig. 5.8(a)-(c)
show the 500th frame in the original, fingerprinted and compressed video sequences.
Fig. 5.9 shows the simulation results on the probability of catching one colluder,
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Pd, versus colluder number, K, under averaging and interleaving collusion attacks




Figure 5.8: Experimental results: (a) Original frame; (b) Fingerprinted frame
before attack with PSNR = 32dB; (c) 3Mbps MPEG compressed frame.
The results shown in Fig. 5.9 is encouraging in that we are able to hold more
than 10 million users and resist more than 100 users’ averaging collusion and 60
users’ interleaving collusion within less than 30 seconds video. The resistance
can be further improved by increasing the video sequence length and employing a
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Figure 5.9: Probability of catching one colluder Pd vs. colluder number c under
averaging and interleaving collusion followed by (a) 3M bps and (b) 1.5M bps
MPEG-2 compression.
larger β value, and trading off the reduced efficiency in distributing fingerprinted
signals. On the other hand, without the joint coding and embedding approach,
the system can only resist about 2 users’ collusion as indicated by the dash line
in Fig. 5.9(a). We can see that the joint coding and embedding strategy can
help overcome the code-level limitation and substantially improve the collusion
resistance at an affordable computational complexity. We further decrease the
compression bit rate down to 1.5Mbps which is of VCD quality and examine the
collusion resistance. Even under this quality, the collusion resistance only reduces
a little under interleaving collusion down to 50 colluders. The resistance under
averaging collusion is till higher than 100 colluders.
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5.2.2 Results under Nonlinear Collusion Attack
The experimental and analytical results that we have presented so far are based on
averaging collusion and interleaving collusion. Our next experiments examine the
collusion resistance under Min-Max attack which can be used as a representative
of non-linear collusion1. In the Min-Max attack, colluders choose the average of
the minimum and maximum values of their copies in each DCT coefficient position
to generate the colluded version. MPEG-2 compression is further applied to the
colluded signal. Fig. 5.10(a) shows the 500th frame of the colluded video after
compression and Fig. 5.10(b) shows the detection probability Pd versus the colluder
number under the Min-Max attack followed by 3Mbps MPEG-2 compression. The
results show that under this non-linear collusion attack, the collusion resistance is
around 80 colluders, which further demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed
large scale fingerprinting. Its performance gap compared with that under averaging
collusion is mainly because the Min-Max collusion introduces higher distortion on
the colluded signal than the averaging collusion [82]. For 80 users’ collusion, the
Mean Squared Error (MSE) introduced to the host signal by averaging attack is
0.94 and is 3.57 by Min-Max attack before MPEG-2 compression. The increased
distortion results in a lower collusion resistance of the system to Min-Max collusion
attack.
It is worth mentioning that the computational complexity of order-statistics
based non-linear collusion significantly increases because of the sorting involved.
In the examined experimental settings, the non-linear collusion attack from 80 col-
luders requires 12 hours while the averaging collusion only needs 70 minutes. This
1Interested readers may refer to [82] for detailed analysis on the relationship and comparison
among various nonlinear collusion attacks.
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high computational complexity can also help deter the colluders from employing
the non-linear collusion on video especially for a large colluder group.






















Figure 5.10: Experimental results under Min-Max collusion followed by 3Mbps
MPEG2 compression: (a) 500th frame after attack; (b) Probability of catching
one colluder Pd vs. colluder number c.
Table 5.2: Time Consumption of the Proposed Efficient Fingerprinting Embedding
and Detection with User Number Nu = 16 Million and 852 VGA Frames
Efficient Scheme Fully Embedding/Matched Filter Detection
Embedding (per copy) 4–5 mins 30 mins
Detection 370 secs 840 secs
5.2.3 Performance Summary
We summarize the time consumption of the embedding and detection in Table 5.2.
The efficient scheme for embedding refers to the way that we generate all the pos-
sible versions beforehand for each subsegment and concatenate these subsegments
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according to each user’s fingerprint code. Fully embedding means we perform the
embedding on the entire host signal for every user without exploring the code struc-
ture. The efficient scheme for detection refers to the trimming detection proposed
in Section 5.1.3. Standard compilation from Microsoft Visual Studio has been ap-
plied to the C++ implementations of both schemes. We can see from Table 5.2
that the code structure of the fingerprinting speeds up the fingerprinted signal
generation by 6-7 times, and the proposed trimming detection only consumes less
than half of the time required by the matched-filter detection.
5.3 Discussions
5.3.1 Relation to Group-based ECC Fingerprinting
The proposed trimming detection utilize the code structure to first detect trimming
symbols and then use these symbols to trim the codebook. This process is similar to
the detection of GRACE fingerprinting proposed in Chapter 4. In this group-based
fingerprinting, the group symbols are first extracted and then only codewords inside
the extracted groups are put under suspicion for further examination. However,
the GRACE fingerprinting cannot be applied here to get efficient detection because
of the following reasons:
First, GRACE fingerprinting spreads group information over the entire sig-
nal, which does not allow the efficient construction of fingerprinted signal. Recall
that the efficiency of the joint coding and embedding fingerprinting lies in the
code structure such that many copies share the same segment. By pre-generating
those segments, we can assemble the fingerprinted signal for each user according
to his/her codeword to meet real-time requirement. However, in GRACE finger-
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printing, the group information is spread over the entire signal and is different for
users from different group. After adding the group information, users have few
segments in common, thus we cannot utilize the efficient construction as before.
Second, the group fingerprinting can be implemented by appending the group
information to maintain the efficiency in fingerprint construction and to employ
permuted sub-segment embedding hoping to protect the group information. This
scheme, however, is vulnerable to the group-framing attack discussed in Section
4.1.4 because colluders can identify the shared sub-segments and guess the group
information.
In contrast, the proposed trimming detection takes advantage of the inherent
code structure and randomization in embedding, which cannot be easily identi-
fied by the colluders but can be explored by the detector to perform the efficient
detection.
5.3.2 Intra-video collusion
The large amount of data in video is a double-edged sword as it also benefits
the attackers. Given one copy of the fingerprinted video, an attacker may apply
multiple-frame collusion [57, 58], whereby several frames are used to estimate and
eventually remove the fingerprint. One possible implementation of such intra-video
attacks is that the attacker may average several frames that have “visually similar”
content but are embedded with independent fingerprint sequences. By collecting
enough frames, this averaging operation can successfully remove the embedded
fingerprint at a possible expense of reduced visual quality. Furthermore, this attack
can be extended to object-based collusion, where similar objects are identified and
averaged or swapped to circumvent the detection. Another possible attack is that
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the attacker may identify several “visually dissimilar” frames or regions embedded
with the same fingerprint sequences and average these frames to estimate the
embedded fingerprint. This estimated fingerprint sequence will then be subtracted
from the fingerprinted signal to obtain an approximation of the original frame. In
each of the above cases, the attacker can succeed by attacking just one fingerprinted
copy without help from other colluders. Therefore, the design and embedding of
the fingerprint sequence should be robust to these intra-video attacks.
A basic principle to resist these attacks is to embed fingerprint sequences based
on the content of the video, i.e. similar fingerprint sequences are embedded in
frames/objects with similar content and different fingerprint sequences are em-
bedded in frames with different content [60]. For example, a scheme proposed by
Fridrich employs the content-based hash of each segment of the signal as a key to
generate watermark sequences [24]. However, this method cannot be directly used
in the ECC-based fingerprinting because of two reasons. First, the fingerprint
spreading sequences in ECC fingerprinting are mainly determined by the code
structure and the designer does not have the freedom to generate the sequences
according to the content. In ECC-based fingerprinting, the spreading sequences
for different symbols should be orthogonal to each other. On the other hand,
the content-based construction of fingerprint sequences would lead to correlated
spreading sequences for different symbols, which conflicts with the fingerprint con-
struction for ECC fingerprinting. Second, the correlation between the watermark
sequences for two frames generated in [24] decrease exponentially as the Hamming
distance between their hash values increases. This change is so dramatic that it
may result in visually similar frames having quite different watermarks. Therefore,
to address the intra-video collusion attack, we need to find a mechanism that is
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Figure 5.11: Illustration of hash-based fingerprint construction.
able to convert the sequence structure imposed by the codeword to what the video
content demands, and build content based fingerprints such that the difference
between fingerprints of two frames is linear with respect to the difference of frame
content.
Since consecutive frames in one scene are visually similar, we can repeatedly
embed the same fingerprint sequence into those consecutive frames. For those
visually dissimilar frames that are assigned similar fingerprint sequences based on
ECC construction, we need to modify the fingerprint sequences to be dissimilar.
To achieve this goal, we can use the hash of each frame to adjust the fingerprint
sequences. For example, frame i and frame j have hash h(i) and h(j), respectively,
each of which is a v-bit binary sequence. If frame i and frame j are visually similar,
the Hamming distance between h(i) and h(j), D(h(i), h(j)), would be very small, i.e.
only a few bit positions are different; if they are visually different, D(h(i), h(j)) will
be very large. As illustrated in Fig. 5.11, we choose a binary secret key κ with the
same length v as the frame hash to generate fingerprint sequence. For each frame
i, we generate v new keys by replacing κ’s nth bit with hi’s n
th bit, n = 1, ..., v.
Meanwhile, the fingerprint sequence for the current frame is divided into v blocks.
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Each of these v new keys is used to permute one block. The concatenation of
these v permuted blocks will be the final fingerprint sequence for frame i. With
this method, visually similar frames will have many permuted blocks in common,
thus the overall sequence will be similar; and visually dissimilar frames will have
dissimilar sequences. The correlation between the sequences changes linearly with
the Hamming distance between two frames’ hashes.
5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we consider fingerprinting video signal under such challenging
settings as to accommodate millions of users and to resist hundreds of users’ col-
lusion. Our work of joint coding and embedding ECC fingerprinting has shown an
excellent trade-off between collusion resistance and efficient construction and de-
tection, which is promising for large-scale video fingerprinting. Building upon this
improved ECC fingerprinting, we address issues of designing code structure and
speeding up detection. We have found out that directly applying the joint coding
and embedding fingerprinting scheme is preferred for a good trade-off between ef-
ficient generation and collusion resistance. The proposed trimming approach can
speed up the detection by 3 orders of magnitude with only slightly drop of detection
accuracy. With the proposed fingerprint construction and efficient detection, the
system holding 16 million users can resist 50-60 colluders’ interleaving collusion and
more than 100 users’ averaging collusion as well as 80 users’ non-linear collusion.
The user capacity and collusion resistance can be further increased by adjusting
such system parameters as k and β. Both the analysis and the experimental re-
sults show a strong potential of joint coding and embedding ECC fingerprinting
for large-scale video fingerprinting applications.
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5.5 Appendix: Derivations
5.5.1 Derivation of Detection Probability Pd of (5.2)
Based on the distribution of the detection statistic in Eqn. (5.1), we derive the
probability of detection as follows. We denote the maximum detection statistic for
colluder and innocent user as T1 and T2, respectively. That is,
T1 = max
i∈SC
Ti, T2 = max
i/∈SC
Ti.
The probability of catching one colluder using the maximum detector (2.6) can be
expressed as
Pd = Pr(T1 > T2) ≈
∫ ∞
−∞
Pr(T1 > t)fT2(t)dt, (5.11)
The approximation in the above equation comes from the simplification on the in-
dependence between T1 and T2 due to small correlation ρ. To obtain an expression
of Pd, we employ the results on order statistics from [63]: Let x = [X1, ..., Xn]
′
have an n-dimension Gaussian distribution Nn(μ,Σ) such that the mean value μi,
variance σ2i of Xi, and the correlation coefficient ρij of Xi and Xj satisfy
μ1 = μ2 = ... = μn = μ;
σ21 = σ
2




ρij = ρ ∈ [0, 1].
Then the density function and distribution function of nth smallest variable X(n),




















φ(z)dz, for x ∈ (−∞,∞),
where f(n)(z) = nΦ
n−1(z)φ(z), F(n)(z) = Φn(z). (5.12)
122
Here, Φ(·) and φ(·) denote the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) and the
probability density function (p.d.f.) of standard Gaussian distribution N(0, 1),
respectively. Based on this result, we can get the c.d.f. for T1 and p.d.f. for T2 by
plugging in the proper μ value with m1 for colluder and m2 for innocent user. The






















5.5.2 Derivation of Pr(c) and CK
From Eqn. (5.7), we can see that to get the overall detection probability Pd, we need
to obtain two quantities: the set of possible c patterns for K colluders, CK , and
the probability for each pattern to occur, Pr(c). We assume that the collusion
happens randomly among a total of qk users, and the total number of possible





. For a given color pattern c = [c1, c2, ..., cq], the







, where θ is the number of instances of color







is the number of choices of colluders’ codeword













To calculate θ, we first take a look at an example with q = 4, and K = 7. We use
{A,B,C,D} to denote the four colors in the alphabet. The possible instances of a
color pattern c = [1 1 2 0] are {ABCC} {ABBC} {AABC} {ABDD} {ABBD}













= 12 instances. For any value of q, K and c, the value of θ can
be obtained as follows. For a given color pattern c = [c1, c2, ..., cn, 0, 0...0] leading
by n non-zero elements, we derive a histogram vector a = [a1, a2, ..., am], where
m is the number of distinct values in vector c and ai is the number of occurrence
of ith value in vector c. For the above example c = [1 1 2 0], we have a = [2 1]
indicating that there are two ‘1’s and one ‘2’ in c. Apparently,
∑m
i=1 ai = n. Then
































The next step is to derive the color patterns for a given K, denoted as CK . In
the following, we use a matrix to represent CK in which each row is a color pattern.
CK can be derived as follows:
For K = 1:
C1 = [1];





















1 1 1 1
1 1 2 0
1 3 0 0
2 2 0 0

















where C\IK denote the set of vectors in CK excluding the rows containing element
in I. 1 represents an all “1” column vector with the same number of entries as
the row number of CK−1, and 2 represents an all “2” column vector with the same
number of entries as the row number of C\{1}K−2, and so on. If C\{1,...,j−1}K−j for some j
is empty, then the sub-matrix [ j C\{1,...,j−1}K−j ] will not appear in CK . In the above
equations, each row vector contains q elements. For simplicity in representation,
we omit the zeros at the end of each row. A full vector can be obtained by simply
appending zeros at the end of each row to reach q elements.
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Chapter 6
Exploring Dynamic and QIM
Fingerprinting
In this chapter, we explore two directions for further study on multimedia finger-
printing, namely dynamic fingerprinting and QIM based multimedia fingerprinting
with blind detection. The dynamic fingerprinting is designed for the applications
allowing long term subscription from users, whereby users have access to multi-
ple signals during a certain period. In this system, the fingerprinting scheme will
change dynamically according to the observed collusion pattern to increase the
probability of catching colluders. The second problem we consider in this chapter
is the Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) fingerprinting scheme for blind detec-
tion. QIM is known for its excellent performance under blind detection, and thus
we choose this embedding method in our study. Since there is no prior work in the
literature on QIM based fingerprinting, we first explore how to apply QIM to the
fingerprinting problem and then we will examine several QIM-based fingerprinting
and compare their performance with spread-spectrum based fingerprinting.
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6.1 Dynamic Fingerprinting for Multimedia
Nowadays, subscription based content services have become very popular, such
as cable TV or online downloading, where users can obtain multimedia content
from the content provider during the subscription period. One example is cable
TV subscription service, through which people can have many options to view TV
program or movies. Another example is the online subscription of movie download,
where the user set up an account with the server, and download movies by signing
in with his/her account. It is important to protect the content from unauthorized
redistribution during the subscription period.
Most fingerprinting works address the anti-collusion problem for one signal in
a static way, i.e. the fingerprint for each user is designed before-hand [70]. One of
the first several works considering dynamic traitor tracing is by Fiat et al [23] and
was improved in [6, 61]. In their work, the host signal is transmitted in segments,
and the fingerprint in each segment is dynamically determined according to the
detected fingerprints from previous segments. After collecting many segments,
the detector makes a decision on the likely colluder. A major limitation of the
work is the assumptions on real-time surveillance feedback and on dumb colluders,
which may not always be realistic. Although it is possible to extend Fiat’s dynamic
fingerprinting to subscription scenarios of multiple programs by treating one movie
as one segment, the detector has to collect tens of pirated movies for the algorithm
to converge to catch ten colluders out of only 1000 users. If the total number of
users scales up to millions, the detector has to collect nearly 100 pirated movies to
catch colluders, which is impractical. Based on the work by Fiat et al., Safavi-Naini
et al. proposed a sequential traitor tracing scheme [53], whereby the fingerprint
for each signal segment is predetermined, rather than dynamic, and the detection
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is performed sequentially.
In this section, we consider the time dimension of the subscription based ser-
vices and exploit the dynamics between the content owner and the colluders to
design fingerprint [36]. Specifically, we adjust the fingerprint strength dynamically
according to the colluders’ information collected from previous pirated signals. To
better understand the performance of the proposed scheme, we also examine pos-
sible strategies that colluders may take to combat dynamic fingerprinting. Results
show that the proposed scheme has better collusion resistance than static ones and
is robust to various collusion strategies.
6.1.1 Problem Description and Basic Fingerprinting Scheme
A dynamic fingerprinting scheme consists of several rounds. Each round i employs
a basic fingerprinting system Fi. The content owner distributes a signal xi with
fingerprint embedded to all users in the system. After receiving the fingerprinted
signals, the colluders collectively generate a copy zi and redistribute it. When
a detector obtains a colluded copy zi, detection is performed on zi to identify
colluder(s). According to the detection results, the content owner redesign the
fingerprint for round i + 1 to increase the chances for colluders being caught. As a
result, the fingerprinting scheme for round i + 1, Fi+1, is a function of Fi and the
collusion strategy Ki, i.e. Fi+1 = f(Fi,Ki), where f() is the dynamic fingerprinting
strategy. The same process will continue in round i + 1.
In this work, we employ orthogonal fingerprinting [71] as the basic fingerprinting
scheme for each round and this basic fingerprinting scheme can be replaced by
other fingerprinting systems [27,28,34] according to the application requirements.
In orthogonal fingerprinting, mutually orthogonal spreading sequences {uj, j =
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1...Nu} with identical energy ||u||2 are assigned to Nu users as the fingerprints.
User j’s fingerprinted copy is obtained as yj = x + uj. After the distribution of
the fingerprinted copies, the adversaries may employ various attacks K. In this
chapter we focus on averaging collusion 1, where colluders take the average of the
corresponding signal in their copies to generate a colluded version. Additional
distortion may be added to the multimedia signal during the collusion, which we
model as an additive noise. Since few colluders would be willing to take higher
risk than others, they generally would make contributions of approximately equal











uj + x + d, (6.1)
where Sc is the colluder set with size K. The additional distortion is modelled as
an i.i.d. additive Gaussian noise d with zero-mean and variance σ2d.
To identify colluders who have contributed to a suspicious copy of multimedia
content, we employ a correlation detector commonly used for spread spectrum
embedding. In this work, we focus on catching one colluder with high probability,
for which the maximum detector [71] is employed. The user with the highest
correlation with the test signal is identified as the colluder: ĵ = arg maxNuj=1 Tj,
where
Tj =
(z− x)Tuj√‖u‖2 j = 1, ..., Nu, (6.2)
The colluder set in each round can be the same or different. In this chapter, we
first consider the case of static colluder set, in which colluders remain the same for
1For orthogonal fingerprinting with Gaussian distributed fingerprints, a number of non-linear
collusions employing order statistics, such as minimum collusion attack, have been shown [82] to
be well approximated by the averaging collusion plus additive noise.
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each round. In Section 6.1.3, we will discuss the dynamic strategies that colluders
can employ in different rounds.
6.1.2 Dynamic Fingerprinting via Strength Scaling
Dynamic Fingerprinting Scheme
For simplicity, we start with a two-round system, and assumes the content owner
initially does not have information about the colluders. In the first round, the
content owner assumes every user has equal probability to collude, and the or-
thogonal fingerprinting with equal strength is employed. When a pirated copy is
leaked, the correlation based detector in Eqn. (6.2) is employed to identify col-
luder. In this work, we choose not to immediately disconnect the colluder from the
service. Notice that the action of disconnecting the detected colluder will inform
the attackers that the content owner has identified some colluder(s), which will
trigger complicated collusion strategies from the attackers. We will leave this case
as our future work.
We design the fingerprints of the second round based on the detection statistic
T (1) from the first round. Given the statistic {T (1)i } for each user, a threshold h
is chosen such that the users whose detection statistic is higher than h are put
into the suspicious user set Us. The fingerprint strength of the users in Us will be
increased by a small amount β in the second round to increase the probability of
catching colluder(s). That is, for users in Us, the fingerprinted copy is obtained as
y = x + (1 + β)u. Other users’ fingerprint strength remains as ‖u‖. The strategy
of increasing only suspicious users’ fingerprint energy instead of all the users is
important in the applications where it is crucial to guarantee innocent users to get
high-fidelity content. The parameters h and β in the proposed scheme enable the
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designer to achieve a trade-off between the detection performance and the received
perceptual quality according to various applications’ requirements.
After finding out a suspicious copy in the second round, the content owner
employs the correlation detector in Eqn. (6.2) to identify colluder. As will be seen
from Section 6.1.2, the increased fingerprint strength will increase the colluders’
probability of being caught while the probability of false alarm remains unchanged.
The detection statistic from second round T
(2)









2 to facilitate the final decision, where we pick the user with
highest T as the colluder.
Analyzing Colluder Detection Performance
In this section, we analyze the probability of catching one colluder for the pro-
posed dynamic fingerprinting. For comparison purpose, we also analyze two other
alternatives: (1) repeatedly employing equal-energy orthogonal fingerprinting with
the same fingerprint energy for both rounds, which we call static fingerprinting,
and (2) employing equal-energy orthogonal fingerprinting for the first round and
increasing the energy by β for all the users in the second round, called blind dy-
namic fingerprinting since it does not utilize the detection results from the first
round.
For all three schemes, the first step is to determine the distribution of T (1) and







2 for each user. After obtaining the distribution of Ti’s, we are able to
calculate the probability of detection as
Pd = Pr(TM1 > TM2) =
∫
Pr(TM1 > t)fTM2(t)dt (6.3)
where TM1 = maxi∈Sc Ti, TM2 = maxi/∈Sc Ti, and fTM2(t) is the p.d.f. of TM2. For all
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Figure 6.1: Performance of three schemes: (a) Simulation results vs. analytical
results; (b) Analytical results for all three schemes (c) Portion of users having
higher fingerprint strength in the second round.
three schemes, Ti for innocent users are the same and follow Gaussian distributions















where Nu is the total number of users, and Φ() and φ() are the c.d.f. and p.d.f. of
standard Gaussian distribution, respectively.
The detection statistic T for static fingerprinting and blind dynamic finger-
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N(0, σ2d), i /∈ Sc,
N(μC , σ
2
d), i ∈ Sc,
(6.5)
where μC takes value of
√
2‖u‖/K  μC1 for static fingerprinting and (2 +
β)‖u‖/(√2K)  μC2 for blind dynamic fingerprinting.
To determine the distribution of T for the proposed dynamic fingerprinting, we
need to first calculate the probability of T
(1)
i having higher value than the threshold
after the first round. This probability, denoted as psi, is the probability for each
user to be put into a suspicious user set. In this work, we set the threshold h
adaptively as h = γ maxi T
(1)






j < t/γ)fTi(t)dt. (6.6)
Due to the equal energy and orthogonal fingerprint construction in the first round,
psi for all the innocent users are the same. We denote it as ps0. Similarly, psi for
all the colluders would be the same under fair collusion, and we denote it as ps1.




N(0, σ2d), i /∈ Sc,
N(μC2, σ
2
d), with prob. ps1 i ∈ Sc
N(μC1, σ
2
d), with prob. 1− ps1 i ∈ Sc,
(6.7)
















⎟⎠ pis1(1− ps1)K−i. (6.8)
Plugging in the obtained results into Eqn. (6.3), we can obtain the probability of
catching one colluder for all three schemes.
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We validate the analysis through simulations with 5000 iterations. The exam-
ined system holds 1000 users, and the fingerprint length is 104, which is roughly the
number of embeddable components in a 256×256 natural image. The first round
of all three systems employs orthogonal fingerprinting with equal strength. In the
second round, the static fingerprinting keeps the same fingerprint strength; the
two dynamic fingerprinting schemes employ β = 0.2 to introduce a small amount
of extra distortion, which is equivalent to 1.6dB loss in PSNR. Fig. 6.1(a) shows
the simulation results on probability of detection Pd along with the numerical eval-
uation of Eqn. (6.3), where we select the results of static fingerprinting and the
proposed dynamic fingerprinting as representatives. We can see that the analytical
results match well with simulation results.
Comparison of Fingerprinting Schemes
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed dynamic fingerprinting
in comparison with the other two alternatives. The experimental settings are the
same as above. The adaptive threshold γ for the proposed dynamic fingerprinting
is set at 0.1 and 0.3, respectively. Fig. 6.1 (b) shows the analytical results of Pd
versus the colluder number K at a Fingerprint-to-Noise Ratio of -5dB for all three
schemes. We can see that the collusion resistance of the blind dynamic fingerprint-
ing is better than that of static fingerprinting due to higher fingerprint strength in
the second round. With the same detection probability, e.g. Pd=0.85, the static
fingerprinting can only resist 51 colluders, while the blind dynamic fingerprinting
can resist 59 colluders giving a 16% improvement in collusion resistance. The per-
formance of the proposed dynamic fingerprinting lies in between and is close to
blind dynamic fingerprinting scheme. For example, with γ = 0.1, the proposed
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dynamic fingerprinting can catch 6 ∼ 7 more colluders than static fingerprinting.
As the threshold γ decreases, the collusion resistance of the proposed scheme gets
closer to that of blind dynamic fingerprinting.
Although blind dynamic fingerprinting has the highest detection probability in
all three schemes, everyone in the system, including innocent users, suffers a larger
distortion in the second round of content distribution because of the increased
fingerprint strength. This is unfair for the innocent users. In comparison, the
proposed dynamic fingerprinting only increases the fingerprint strength for the
suspicious users. Fig. 6.1(c) shows the portion of the innocent users’ and colluders’
fingerprint to be increased. From the results, we can see that with γ = 0.1, only
37% of the innocent users receive content with larger distortion in the second round
and 68% of the colluders have their fingerprint energy increased, and we are able to
achieve almost the same detection performance as the blind dynamic fingerprinting
where all users have larger distortion. As we increase γ, fewer innocent users and
colluders receive low quality signal, which leads a lower Pd. We can see that γ is a
parameter used to achieve a trade-off between the collusion resistance performance
and user satisfaction. Overall, the proposed dynamic fingerprinting has a better
trade-off than the other two schemes.
6.1.3 Dynamic Collusion Strategies
The results shown in the last section are based on the assumptions that the collud-
ers remain the same in both rounds. However, knowing the dynamic fingerprinting
is employed, colluders may take different strategies in each round to circumvent
the proposed fingerprinting. In this section, we examine the possible strategies
that the colluders may take, and study the performance of the proposed dynamic
135
















 over one round
P
d
 over two rounds
Figure 6.2: Pd of the proposed scheme against distinct colluder set.
fingerprinting against those collusion strategies. Here we assume that each of the
colluders is honest to the coalition, and issues regarding selfish colluder can be
studied following the framework in [81].
The effectiveness of the proposed scheme comes from the fact that the colluders
participate the collusion in both rounds so that (1) the colluders may be detected
as suspicious user in the first round and get fingerprint of increased strength for
second round; (2) after participating the collusion in the second round, his/her
probability of being detected is higher than before due to the increased fingerprint
energy. Observing this, colluders may form different collusion sets for each round
to circumvent the dynamic fingerprinting.
Suppose there are totally K colluders, denoted as Sc. The colluders decide to
choose a subset of the colluders to collude in the first round and use a different
subset of colluders for the second round. We denote the colluder set in the first
round as Sc1 with K1 colluders, in the second round as Sc2 with K2 colluders, and
Sc = Sc1∪Sc2. The ratio of the colluders in the first round over the entire colluder
group is denoted as K1/K = η. We define an overlap ratio as ξ = |SC1 ∩ SC2|/K.
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It is obvious that K2+K1 = (1+ξ)K. The parameters η and ξ feature the strategy
employed by the colluders. For simplicity, we consider the colluder set for both
rounds to have the same colluder number, which imposes one more constraint of
η = 1 + ξ − η. Under this model, the collusion strategy with repeated colluder
set we have examined in Section 6.1.2 is a special case with η = ξ = 1. Now we
examine other two cases, namely, disjoint colluder set and overlapped colluder set.
Disjoint Colluder Set In this strategy, the colluders divide themselves into two
disjoint groups and each group performs collusion attack in one round, i.e. η = 0.5,
ξ = 0. As a result, every colluder participates the collusion only in one round.
Under this case, the detection statistic T based on both rounds has distribution
close to that of the static fingerprinting as in Eqn. (6.5), and thus the detection
performance would be similar to that of the static fingerprinting. However, due to
the smaller colluder group in each round, the basic fingerprinting system in each
round has a higher probability of detection as shown in Fig. 6.2. In this case, at
each round, the detector is able to make decision without aggregating the detection
statistics from multiple rounds, and the colluders actually have higher risk of being
caught than before.
Overlapped Colluder Set In this case, some colluders only participate in one
round of collusion and some participate in both rounds. The two parameters η
and ξ are within the range of 0.5 < η < 1, 0 < ξ < 1. In Fig. 6.3, we show
the probability of detection under this collusion strategy, where we examined two
settings: η = 0.6, ξ = 0.2 and η = 0.9, ξ = 0.8. Comparing the results with that of
Section 6.1.2, we can see that the overlapped colluder set brings the detector up to
10% increase in probability of detection. As ξ and η approach 1, the performance
approaches to the case with the same colluder set in both rounds. The strategy
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Figure 6.3: Pd of the proposed scheme against overlapped colluder set.
with overlapped colluder set does not bring benefit to the colluders. Fairness issues
inside the colluders would also arise, which will be addressed in our future work.
In summary, if we look at only one round, both strategies with distinct and
overlapped colluder set reduce the colluder number in each round and increase
the colluders’ risk of being caught; if we collectively examine two rounds, the
overlapped strategy also increase the probability of detection. Therefore, the best
strategy for colluders would be to try to collect as many colluders as possible in
each round and launch the collusion attack altogether, which is the case that we
have examined in Section 6.1.2.
6.2 QIM based Multimedia Fingerprinting
In the collusion-resistant multimedia fingerprinting literature, most of the schemes
use spread spectrum techniques to embed the fingerprints. Under non-blind detec-
tion, spread spectrum based fingerprint embedding has high detection accuracy.
However, in applications where the detection is performed without the original
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signal, the host signal acts as strong noise to the detector in the spread spec-
trum based fingerprinting and thus the detection accuracy is very low. An impor-
tant alternative to spread spectrum embedding is Quantization Index Modulation
(QIM) [11, 12]. In QIM, the host data is quantized using multiple quantizers, the
index of which is chosen based on the message to be embedded. The advantages
of the QIM embedding is the high detection accuracy under blind detection. In
this section, we explore the possibility of employing QIM for anti-collusion fin-
gerprinting applications. Specifically, we employ dither modulation (DM) for the
fingerprint embedding [11]. We have observed that the existing DM algorithm pri-
marily focusses on embedding binary bits. We first construct a basic embedding
scheme to resist collusion attacks by extending the existing DM to embed multiple
symbols, and study its performance. To better understand the results, we introduce
a general theoretical model and analyze the collusion resistance of DM based fin-
gerprinting. From our theoretical analysis, we infer that fingerprint sequences with
low correlation have better collusion resistance. We then design a new algorithm
to construct dither sequences so that the resulting fingerprints have low correlation
and are approximately orthogonal. We demonstrate through simulations that our
proposed method performs better than the basic scheme, and compare the results
with those obtained using spread spectrum based fingerprinting. Our results show
that the fingerprint correlation is not easy to control through QIM embedding and
hence it does not perform as well as the spread spectrum based fingerprinting even
under non-blind detection.
Spread Transform Dithered Modulation (STDM) is an alternative robust quan-
tization based embedding approach whereby a random unitary transformation is
applied to the signals before quantization. With this embedding method, every
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bit of information can be spread over the signal. This would have similar effect
as spread spectrum based embedding, and the quantization operation during the
embedding would bring benefits in blind detection scenario. Meanwhile, we no-
tice that the existing QIM embedding techniques are well defined for embedding
binary bits, and our results on DM based fingerprinting show that it is non-trivial
to extend these methods to embed non-binary symbols. In principle, it would be
possible to construct binary fingerprint sequences employing collusion-secure codes
such as Boneh-Shaw’s [9] for fingerprinting multimedia. However, since these codes
are designed without considering the embedding issues explicitly, they are often
too long to be reliably embedded [9], and/or are unable to resist a nontrivial num-
ber of colluders [5]. For example, to attain moderate levels of collusion resistance
such as to resist 10 colluders out of 1000 users, the Boneh-Shaw code requires a
long codeword at least on the order of 106 bits. Such high payloads often exceed
the embedding capacity for most multimedia data under stringent robustness re-
quirements. In this section, we propose to use non-binary fingerprint code, such
as traceability code employed in [33] and map each symbol to a binary codeword
through an efficient construction for embedding [59].
6.2.1 Fingerprinting Model and QIM Review
Spread Spectrum based Fingerprinting
Spread spectrum embedding has been widely used for multimedia fingerprint-
ing [33,64,71]. One typical example is orthogonal fingerprinting, whereby mutually
orthogonal spreading sequences are generated as fingerprint for each user. Another
way to construct fingerprint is to employ a coding step, such as error correcting
code (ECC), and map symbols in the alphabet to orthogonal sequences [30]. The
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ith user’s fingerprinted copy yi is obtained by adding his/her fingerprint sequence
si to the host signal x, i.e.
yi = x + si. (6.9)
After the fingerprinted copies reach end users, some users may mount collusion
attacks and try to remove the traces of the embedded fingerprint. Averaging collu-
sion plus additive noise is mostly studied in the literature [71,76] and a number of
non-linear collusions have been shown to be well approximated by this model [82].







yi + n, (6.10)
where Sc is the colluder set containing c colluders, n = [n1, n2, . . . , nN ]
T is additive
noise that models additional distortions applied on the colluded signal, and N is
the length of the fingerprint sequence. For simplicity, we assume n follows an i.i.d.
Gaussian distribution.
The goal of the detector is to catch at least one of the colluders with a high
probability given the suspicious copy, z. As the host signal can be made available to
detectors in many fingerprinting applications, we subtract the host signal from the
suspicious copy to obtain a test signal. Match filter detector is then employed to
find the colluder; that is, we correlate the test signal with each of the Nu spreading
sequences (one for each user) and identify the sequence that gives the maximum
correlation. The detection statistic for the ith user is defined as
Ti =
(z− x)T si√||si||2 , (6.11)
and the m̂th user is declared as a colluder if
m̂ = arg maxi=1,2,...,NuTi. (6.12)
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Quantization Index Modulation(QIM)
Dither Modulation(DM) In quantization based methods, the host data is
quantized using multiple quantizers and the index of the quantizer is chosen based
on the message to be embedded [11]. A simple way to build multiple quantizers
is by dither modulation (DM). Specifically, for a host-signal x, the embedding
function for hiding binary messages can be written as
qxi = QΔ(x + di)− di ∀i ∈ {0, 1}, (6.13)
where QΔ(.) represents the quantization function with step size Δ and di represents
the dither sequence that is used to perturb the host signal before quantization. One
possible way to construct the dither sequence is by first choosing one dither vector
(say d0) as i.i.d. random variables following a uniform distribution over [−Δ2 , Δ2 ]







if d0k < 0,
d0k − Δk2 if d0k ≥ 0,
∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (6.14)
where di = [di1, di2, . . . , diN ]
T .
It has been shown in [11, 20] that the rate-distortion and robustness tradeoff
can be improved in the basic QIM method by compensation and other postpro-
cessing operations. In the distortion compensated QIM (DC-QIM), a fraction of
the quantization error is added back to the original signal. Thus, the watermarked





(x + di)− di
)
+ (1− α)x ∀i ∈ {0, 1}, (6.15)
where the constant α can be chosen appropriately to maximize the Signal-to-Noise
Ratio (SNR) [11] or to maximize embedding capacity [20,45].
142
Spread Transform Dither Modulation (STDM) Another robust way to im-
plement QIM is STDM. Instead of applying scalar DM directly on each component
of host signal, STDM first applies a random unitary transformation by projecting
the host signal x onto a random direction, u. The projection values, x(p) = uTx,
are then quantized using DM to obtain the watermarked signal [11], i.e.
y = x + (y(p) − x(p))u, (6.16)
y(p) = Q	(x(p) + db)− db, b ∈ {0, 1}, (6.17)
where b is the message bit to be embedded. Typically, the projection direction u
is randomly generated according to a secret key, and therefore we do not need to
introduce uncertainty in the choice of dither sequence db. In our implementation,
we choose the dither sequences to be deterministic. Due to random projections,
only the noise in the direction of u would affect performance. Thus, the STDM
provides a higher effective Watermark to Noise Ratio (WNR), and is more robust
against additive noise attacks [11].
During the detection, the test signal z = y + n, is projected onto vector u to




arg minb=0,1 ‖z(p) − (Q	(x(p) + db)− db)‖ for non-blind detection,
arg minb=0,1 ‖z(p) − (Q	(z(p) + db)− db)‖ for blind detection.
(6.18)
6.2.2 Dither Modulation based Fingerprinting
Extending QIM to Fingerprinting
It is known in the recent literature that lattice-based quantizers can be used to
embed multiple alphabets [80], but they generally have a very high computational
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complexity. To overcome this problem, we consider a simple extension of the
DM scheme for embedding multiple symbols, i.e. use mutually orthogonal dither
sequences for each user. Specifically, we construct Nu random dither sequences di
following an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution such that E(dTi dj) = 0 ∀i, j ∈ {1, ..., Nu}
and i = j. The fingerprinted copies are then obtained using Eqn. (6.15).
When the content owner obtains the suspicious copy z, he/she can apply max-
imum likelihood detection, which would involve an exhaustive search over O(2Nu)
different colluder combinations. Although this detector is optimal in minimizing
the probability of detection error, its complexity is very high and grows exponen-
tially with the number of users. Therefore, in our implementation, we apply the
minimum-distance detection as used in the QIM literature [11] to find one of the
colluders. More specifically, the m̂th user is declared a colluder if
m̂ = arg mink=1,2,...Nu ||z− yk||2. (6.19)
This detector also provides a fair comparison with the spread spectrum based
fingerprinting employing match filter detection of Eqn. (6.11).
We simulated this basic scheme for Nu = 1024 users under averaging collusion
on a 256 × 256 size Lena image with the PSNR of the fingerprinted image with
respect to the original set to 42dB. The embedding was done in the block DCT
domain and the quantization step sizes were chosen according to the JPEG quanti-
zation table. We examine the probability of catching one colluder, Pd, at different
watermark-to-noise-ratio (WNR), and the results are shown in Fig. 6.4(a). For
comparison purposes, we show in Fig. 6.4(c) the performance of a spread spectrum
based fingerprinting under the same conditions. From the results, we observe that
the basic QIM-based fingerprinting can only resist about half dozen colluders at




















































































Figure 6.4: Comparison on the performance of QIM-based and spread spectrum
based fingerprinting: (a) Basic QIM-based Fingerprinting; (b) Improved QIM-
based Fingerprinting; (c) Spread spectrum based Fingerprinting; (d) Results under
WNR= −10dB.
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more than 30 colluders with high probability in the same WNR range. To facil-
itate the analysis of results, we build a theoretical model to study the detection
performance in the next subsection.
Theoretical Analysis of QIM-based Fingerprinting
Without loss of generality, we assume the first c colluders perform averaging collu-
sion as formulated in Eqn. (6.10). Then, the probability of catching one colluder,
Pd, is
Pd = Pr(min(X1, X2, . . . , Xc) < min(Xc+1, Xc+2, . . . , XNu)), (6.20)
where Xk = ||z− yk||2 is the detection statistic for user k. We can show that for
a system with totally Nu users and c colluders, X = [X1, X2, . . . , XNu ]
T approx-
imately follows a multi-variate Gaussian distribution with mean and covariance
matrix given by:















+ Nσ2n if c + 1 ≤ k ≤ Nu,
(6.21)













where N is the length of fingerprint sequence, σ2n is variance of the additive noise,
and Λ is the average mean square difference between two fingerprinted copies. The
146





























(a) WNR = −5dB (b) WNR = −10dB
Figure 6.5: Theoretical results on probability of correct detection with respect to
number of colluders for different ρ values
matrix P(Nu×Nu) is given by
P (i, j) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
c− 1 if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ c and i = j,
−1 if 1 ≤ i, j ≤ c and i = j,
0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ c and j > c,
0 if 1 ≤ j ≤ c and i > c,
c + 1 if c < i, j ≤ Nu and i = j,
1 if c < i, j ≤ Nu and i = j.
(6.23)
The detailed derivation is described in Section 6.2.4. We remark that the above
theoretical framework is general and applicable to any fingerprinting scheme as
long as the distance between any pair of fingerprints is identical. Thus, this model
can help explain the results obtained by spread spectrum techniques as well.
From Eqn. (6.21), we notice that the difference between the means of Xk for
the colluders and the innocent users is Δm = Λ
c
. Thus, we infer that the aver-
age performance in terms of probability of catch one colluder would improve as
the distance between two fingerprint sequences, Λ, is increased, or the number of
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colluders c is decreased. This result can also be interpreted in terms of the correla-
tion between the fingerprint sequences ρ = 1− Λ
2W
(W is the average energy of the
fingerprint). In Fig. 6.5, we show the probability of correct decision Pd for differ-
ent values of the correlation parameter ρ by numerically evaluating the theoretical
model. We observe from the plot that the performance of the fingerprinting system
increases when ρ reduces (or Λ increases). Based on this principle, we examine
the correlation for basic QIM-based fingerprinting. We observe that the main rea-
son for our basic QIM construction not performing well compared to the spread
spectrum case is because the resulting correlation value ρ = 0.45 was much higher
than that of the spread spectrum based fingerprinting (close to zero). Therefore,
in order to improve the collusion resistance of QIM-based fingerprinting, we need
to carefully select dither sequences so that the resulting fingerprint sequences have
low correlation. In the next section, we propose a new technique that will help
reduce the correlation and improve the detection performance.
Improved Dither Sequence Construction for QIM-based Fingerprinting
According to the theoretical model, for best results, the dither sequences should be
constructed so as to make the final fingerprints have as low correlation as possible.
The problem can be formulated as
min (QΔ(x+di)−x−di)T (QΔ(x+dj)−x−dj), ∀ i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nu}, i = j,
(6.24)
subject to the fairness constraints that the fingerprint energies for different users
are equal, i.e.
(QΔ(x + di)− x− di)T (QΔ(x + di)− x− di) = W, ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , Nu. (6.25)
Let Δ = [Δ1, Δ2, . . . , ΔN ]
T , where Δk is the step size of the uniform quantizer in
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the kth component. We can show that the quantization operation (for the mid-
raiser quantizer) is given by




where a = [a1, a2, . . . , aN ]
T , Yi = [Yi1, Yi2, . . . , YiN ]
T and Δ⊗Yi = [Δ1Yi1, Δ2Yi2, . . . ,
ΔNYiN ]




tkΔk if tkΔk ≤ xk < (tk + 0.5)Δk,







≤ dik < (ak − xk),
1 if (ak − xk) ≤ dik < Δk2 .
(6.28)
Here, we assume that −Δk
2
≤ dik < Δk2 . Note that ak is a multiple of the quantiza-
tion step size Δk, that is closest to the host data sample xk. Further, the value of




the residue term that would choose one among the two nearby quantization points
based on the value of the dither sequence.
By substituting Eqns. (6.27) and (6.28) back into the minimization problem,
and using the Lagrange multipliers to incorporate the equal-energy constraints we
obtain an equivalent cost function−J given by
J = (a− x + 1
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where ν1 and ν2 are Lagrange multiplier constants. Setting the gradient of J with






Δ⊗Yi − κi(x− a), (6.30)
where κi are scalars chosen so that the total energy of the fingerprint is equal to
W . In our implementations, we first choose the vectors Yi ∈ {−1, 1}N for each
user. The dither sequences are then generated according to Eqn. (6.30). In the
next section, we present the results for this scheme and compare it with our basic
dither based approach presented earlier in Section 6.2.2.
Results and Discussions
To examine the effectiveness of the proposed improvement algorithm, we apply the
constructed dither sequences on the Lena image with the same parameter settings
as in Section 6.2.2; that is, 256 × 256 Lena image fingerprinted with a PSNR of
42dB and Nu = 1024 users. The results are shown in Fig. 6.4(b) alongside the
corresponding plots for the basic QIM scheme and spread spectrum fingerprinting.
For better illustration, we compare the performance of the three schemes at WNR
= −10dB in Fig. 6.4(d). We observe that the improved scheme performs much
better than the basic scheme. This gain can be attributed to the reduced aver-
age correlation among fingerprint sequences in the improved scheme (around 0.1),
compared to a high value of 0.45 in the basic scheme. We also observe that our
improved scheme still does not perform as well as the traditional spread spectrum
based scheme. A closer examination shows that the variance of the correlation
statistic for QIM based fingerprinting is larger (ρ values range from −0.15 to 0.2),
while the spread spectrum based fingerprinting has correlation ranging from −0.04
to 0.04. Owing to the nonlinear quantization operation employed in QIM, it is not
easy to control the correlation between the fingerprints for a total of Nu users as
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in spread spectrum based fingerprinting.
From the results, we can see that in the proposed DM based fingerprinting it is
non-trivial to construct dither sequences to get fingerprint sequences with low cor-
relation. Since the QIM has been well studied for embedding binary bits, a natural
way of using QIM for fingerprinting is to embed binary fingerprint codeword. In
the mean time, we observe that STDM based embedding has an effect of spreading
the embedded bit over the host signal. By choosing mutually orthogonal projection
vectors for different bits, we can achieve an effect similar to the overlapped spread
spectrum embedding. Taking these two factors into consideration, we explore the
STDM based coded fingerprinting in the next section.
6.2.3 STDM based ECC fingerprinting
ECC based fingerprinting with spread spectrum embedding has been shown very
promising in providing an excellent trade-off between the collusion resistance and
detection efficiency [34]. In this section, we explore the performance of STDM
based ECC fingerprinting. For embedding, we propose to map each symbol to a
binary codeword that is constructed to well separate q symbols.
Fingerprint Embedding and Detection
To embed a q-ary fingerprint codeword with length L1, we partition the host signal
into L1 segments. In each segment, we choose a simplex code S(L2,m,D) to
represent each of the q symbols. A simplex code of dimension m has q = 2m
codewords, each of length L2 = 2
m − 1 and provides an equal distance of D =
2m−1. Simplex code has good properties such as a large relative distance (> 0.5)
and a non-trivial code rate; and thus it can support a large alphabet size q with
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better separation among symbols. The binary simplex codeword for each symbol
is embedded into a segment of the host signal through STDM, where we project
the host signal to L2 mutually orthogonal random directions and quantize the
resulting projection values. This has an overall effect of overlapped embedding
that the bits representing one symbol are added on top of each other and spread
over the segment. An illustration is shown in Fig. 6.6.
Table 6.1: Quantization Error for Different Bit Positions (Qstep = 4)
Bit Position 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 ...
Bit 0 1.744 3.388 3.987 1.718 0.970 2.334 0.810 0.796 0.0098 ...
Bit 1 2.256 0.612 0.013 2.282 3.030 1.666 3.190 3.204 3.9902 ...
During our preliminary exploration, we found that due to the randomness of
the projection, the quantization error, or the energy for bit 0 and 1 is not equal.
Table 6.1 list the quantization error for each bit position. We can see that in some
positions, bit 0 is embedded with more energy than bit 1, and vice versa for other
places. This unevenness would make the collusion resistance unpredictable and
make the fingerprinted signals have different visual quality. One way to overcome
this problem is to adjust the dither sequence according to the host signal to make
bit 0 and 1 have equal embedding energy. However, under blind detection, the
detector would not be able to identify the correct dither sequences from the received
signal, which will incur decoding error. In this chapter, we propose to spread each
bit of the simplex codeword to multiple bits by mapping bit 1 to a l-bit random
binary sequence s and 0 to s̄, the bit-wise flipped version of s. The spreading
factor l can be adjusted to tradeoff the perceptibility and robustness. For clear
presentation, we shall use “logic bit” to refer to the bit in the simplex codeword,
























A   0  0  0;   B   1  0  1;   C   0  1  1;   D   1  1  0  
Figure 6.6: An example of embedding q-ary codeword using STDM.
s is embedded into the same segment using STDM by projecting the signal onto
a random direction. As a result, a total of L2l bits for all the L2 logic bit in a
simplex codeword are superposed and spread over one segment of host signal. The
kth fingerprinted segment y(k) can be represented as







ij − x(p)ij )uij, (6.31)
where uij is the projecting direction for the i
th bit in logic bit j’s spreading se-
quence; x
(p)
ij is the projection of the k
th segment host signal x(k) on uij, and y
(p)
ij is
obtain by quantizing x
(p)
ij using Eqn. (6.16).
During the detection, we first calculate the distance information for each bit
according to Eqn. (6.18). Then we add all these distance information from every
bit of each user’s fingerprint codeword. The user who has the smallest distance
with the test signal is declared as colluder.
Results and Discussions
We test the performance of the proposed STDM based ECC fingerprinting on a
256×256 Lena image. We choose Reed-Solomon code (14, 2, 13) as the fingerprint
code with code length 14, dimension 2, and alphabet size 16. Each of the 16
symbols is mapped to a binary codeword of a simplex code (15, 4, 8). Mutually
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orthogonal spreading sequences are chosen for projecting the input data and the
resulting values are quantized using the binary dither modulation method. As
mentioned earlier, we choose deterministic dither sequences d0 = 0 and d1 = /2
to maximize separation. The PSNR of the fingerprinted copy is set at 40.8 dB.
In Fig. 6.7, we show the probability of catching one colluder, Pd, under aver-
aging collusion and additional JPEG compression. The results for the blind and
non-blind scenarios are shown in Fig. 6.7(a) and (b) respectively. We notice that
under moderate JPEG compression, the system is able to resist at least a few
dozen users’ collusion in both cases. When the JPEG quality factor reduces, the
performance drops sharply in the case of blind detection even for a small number
of colluders. This is expected because the projected point z(p) moves outside the
correct decoding region when a large JPEG quantization step size is used. This
leads to wrong estimates of the true projection points x(p), eventually resulting in
a large probability of decoding error. On the other hand, in the case of non-blind
detection, the projected point z(p) provides some information for correct decoding.
Therefore, the performance of non-blind detection degrades gracefully as the JPEG
quality factor reduces and the number of colluders increases.
To facilitate comparison, we also implement the spread spectrum based ECC
fingerprinting with the same Reed-Solomon code, i.e. each symbol is mapped to an
orthogonal spreading sequences before embedding [34]. Matched filter detection is
employed for catching one colluder. Also in Fig. 6.7, we show the results for spread
spectrum based fingerprinting under both the blind detection and non-blind de-
tection. Under blind detection, we notice that the STDM based fingerprinting has
significant advantage over spread spectrum based fingerprinting with up to 90%
increase in Pd. On the other hand, the spread spectrum based ECC fingerprint-
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Figure 6.7: Simulation results of STDM based and spread spectrum based ECC fin-
gerprinting under averaging collusion and JPEG compression: (a) blind detection;
(b) non-blind detection.
ing performs a little better than STDM based scheme under non-blind detection
with less than 5% increase on Pd under moderate JPEG compression. This is
because the spread spectrum based scheme employs orthogonal modulation to em-
bed each symbol, while STDM based scheme use a simplex code, which does not
perform as well as orthogonal modulation in separating different symbols. Over-
all, the proposed STDM based fingerprinting shows significant advantages over
spread spectrum based fingerprinting under blind detection and slightly reduced
performance under non-blind detection.
6.2.4 Appendix: Theoretical Model on QIM based Finger-
printing
In this appendix, we present the theoretical analysis on the performance of fin-
gerprinting schemes employing minimum distance decoding. Let x denote the
host signal and yi represent user i’s fingerprinted copy. In the case of QIM, yi
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is obtained by quantizing the host signal x as shown in Eqn. (6.15). Under the






yi + n, (6.32)
where n denotes the additive noise used to model any further processing. Here, we
assume, without loss of generality, that the first c colluders participate in collusion.
The decoder applies minimum distance decoding as given in Eqn. (6.19) to find
one of the colluders.
The probability of catching one colluder, Pd, is given by
Pd = Pr(min(X1, X2, . . . , Xc) < min(Xc+1, Xc+2, . . . , XNu)), (6.33)
where Xk = ||z−yk||2 is the detection statistic for user k. Substituting for z from
Eqn. (6.32), we get







The detection statistic Xk is a random variable and its distribution would depend
on the noise statistics. The mean of Xk can be obtained as
mk = E(Xk) = s
T
k sk + trace(Σn), (6.35)








gives the average difference between the quantization points among the users in
collusion set. In a similar note, the (i, j)th element of the covariance matrix R of
the detection statistics Xk can be expressed as









where 1N denotes a column vector with all N elements as 1 and w
(l)
n is a N×1 vector
in which the ith element represents the lth order moment of the corresponding noise
component ni.
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If we assume that the noise n is Gaussian with zero mean and variance σ2n, then
the detection statistic would follow the chi-square distribution [47] and its mean
and variance can be simplified as
mk = s
T
k sk + Nσ
2
n, (6.37)





We remark that as the length of the fingerprint N is increased, the detection
statistic can be well approximated as a multi-variate Gaussian distribution [47].








(qxl − qxi)T (qxk − qxj),





Here P (i, j) is given as in Eqn. (6.23) and Λ is the average mean squared difference








||yi − yj||2. (6.40)
Substituting for sTi sj from Eqn. (6.39) into equations (6.37) and (6.38), we obtain
the desired expressions as given in equations (6.21) and (6.22).
6.3 Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have studied two problems related to collusion-resistance multi-
media fingerprinting. The first one is anti-collusion fingerprinting for applications
with long-term subscription, where a group of pirates may launch several rounds of
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collusions. We propose a dynamic fingerprinting strategy to adjust the fingerprint
strength in each round according to the detection results from previous round.
Both analytical and simulation results show that the proposed scheme performs
better, in terms of detection probability, than static fingerprinting and close to
blind dynamic fingerprinting without having as many users suffering from reduced
visual quality. Dynamic collusion strategies are also examined, where the results
indicate that the best strategy for colluders is to gather as many colluders as
possible in each round of the collusion.
The second problem we have considered is to use Quantization Index Modu-
lation (QIM) embedding for fingerprinting applications mainly for blind detection
scenario. In particular, we use spread transform dither modulation (STDM) to
embed the fingerprint code, where each q-ary symbol is mapped to a binary sim-
plex code for embedding. The results show significant advantage of STDM based
embedding over spread spectrum based embedding under blind detection, where
the STDM based fingerprinting has up to 90% improvement in probability of de-
tection over spread spectrum based fingerprinting. This suggests that STDM is a





In this dissertation, we have studied various aspects of fingerprint design in collusion-
resistant fingerprinting for multimedia signals.
Starting from a cross-layer framework for multimedia fingerprinting, we first
examine the end-to-end performance of ECC-based fingerprinting by considering
both the coding and embedding layers. The results show that traditional ECC-
based fingerprinting has high efficiency in distribution of fingerprinted signal and
colluder detection but rather limited collusion resistance. The ECC based fin-
gerprinting motivates us to find avenues to improve its collusion resistance while
preserving its efficient detection and distribution.
Based on the observation from the performance examination, we propose two
new joint-coding-and-embedding techniques, namely, the permuted subsegment
embedding technique and the Group-Based Joint Coding and Embedding (GRACE)
technique. Our results show the significant performance gain of each approach
on the collusion resistance over the conventional ECC-based fingerprinting. We
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then combine these two new schemes to further improve the collusion resistance
and obtain a complete joint-coding-and-embedding design for coded fingerprint-
ing. Our combined design can resist more than three times colluders collusion
as many as that of the conventional ECC-based fingerprinting and retain the low
detection computational complexity. It offers a much improved tradeoff between
the collusion resistance and detection efficiency than the conventional ECC-based
fingerprinting and orthogonal fingerprinting.
Building upon the proposed joint coding and embedding framework, we con-
sider fingerprinting video signal under such challenging settings as to accommodate
millions of users and to resist hundreds of users’ collusion. We further address issues
of designing code structure and speeding up detection. Our proposed trimming
detection approach can speed up the detection by 3 orders of magnitude with only
slightly drop of detection accuracy. With the proposed fingerprint construction
and efficient detection, the system holding 16 million users can resist 50-60 col-
luders’ interleaving collusion and more than 100 users’ averaging collusion as well
as 80 users’ non-linear collusion. The user capacity and collusion resistance can
be further increased by adjusting such system parameters as k and β. Both the
analysis and the experimental results show a strong potential of joint coding and
embedding ECC fingerprinting for large-scale video fingerprinting applications.
The increase in the popularity of the subscription based services, such as cable
TV, motives us to study the problem of anti-collusion fingerprinting for applica-
tions with long-term subscription, where a group of pirates may launch several
rounds of collusions. We propose a dynamic fingerprinting strategy to adjust the
fingerprint strength in each round according to the detection results from previous
rounds. Both analytical and simulation results show that the proposed scheme
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performs better, in terms of detection probability, than static fingerprinting and
close to blind dynamic fingerprinting without having as many users suffering from
reduced visual quality. Dynamic collusion strategies are also examined, where the
results indicate that the best strategy for colluders is to gather as many colluders
as possible in each round of the collusion.
We notice that spread spectrum embedding has been widely used in the existing
multimedia fingerprinting schemes because the host signal is often available at the
detector and thus can facilitate the detection. However, in applications where
the host signal is not easy to obtain, the spread spectrum based fingerprinting
would have low detection accuracy. In this dissertation, we have explored a class
of quantization based embedding methods for fingerprinting applications, whose
advantage is the high detection accuracy under blind detection. Specifically, we
explore coded fingerprinting based on spread transform dither modulation (STDM)
embedding. Simulation results show that this coded STDM based fingerprinting
has significant advantages over spread spectrum based fingerprinting under blind
detection, where the STDM based fingerprinting has up to 90% improvement in
probability of detection over spread spectrum based fingerprinting.
Based on the study of this dissertation, there are several aspects of multime-
dia fingerprinting that can be further explored. First, our current joint-coding-
embedding fingerprinting is mainly examined on uncompressed video data. The
effect of video compression is treated as an additional distortion to our fingerprint
detection. In some scenario, the raw video data may not be available to the finger-
print embedder. For example, in cable TV application, the set-up boxes, where the
fingerprint is embedded, have very limited computing and storage resources and
cannot afford to do the embedding in fully-uncompressed domain. It is desirable
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to embed fingerprint in the compressed domain of the signal to reduce the compu-
tation and delay incurred by the fingerprint embedding. Apparently, results from
the existing work on the uncompressed domain cannot be directly applied to this
case due to different nature of compressed and uncompressed data [67, 68]. Thus
we need to consider the particular property of the embedding domain and jointly
explore the coding and embedding layers for fingerprint design.
Second, this dissertation initiates the research on collusion-resistant dynamic
fingerprinting for multimedia and as the first step of exploration, proposes a sim-
ple but quite effective scheme. There still remain many research questions. From
designer’s perspective, we are interested in the possible strategies to dynamically
design the fingerprints. The choice of the strategy will be closely related to the
collusion pattern observed from the previous rounds. Then how to accurately esti-
mate the collusion pattern and design effective fingerprinting given the estimated
collusion pattern would become two important questions that need to be answered
first. On the other hand, the adversaries will try to seek for the best strategy to
minimize their risk of being caught given the designer’s dynamic strategy. Thus
the interactions between fingerprint designer and attackers is also an interesting
topic to explore, where game theory [25, 46] can be used as a tool to model and
solve the problem.
Finally, the fingerprinting research in this dissertation is to prevent each indi-
vidual user from sharing his/her content with others. A new paradigm for next-
generation multimedia content protection may encourage and take advantage of file
sharing among users [10,42]. This would open up opportunities of new technology-
economics model that builds an incentive-based off-line market for digital media,
and supports the legitimate resale by individual users to others such that both
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consumers and copyright owners/service provider can benefit from the resale rev-
enues. In this new system, the fingerprinting would play an important role to
provide content protection after the system being hacked. Moreover, the embed-
ded fingerprints can also serve as a track mark to facilitate the study of the viral
structure, which is an important input information for the operation of the new
system. It would be interesting to investigate how to design fingerprints so that it
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